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ABSTRACT 
 
The research was conducted as a result of the long standing criticism against undercover 
operations due to the conduct of informers and agents during these operations.  Since both 
undercover operations and informers are controversial issues it may cause serious judicial 
problems if the system is not applied correctly. 
 
The problem was investigated by means of qualitative research.  A thorough literature 
study and semi-structured interviews were used to gather the required data.  Semi-
structured interviews were conducted with advocates of the Director of Public Prosecutions 
Free State and detectives from the Organised Crime Unit of the South African Police 
Service. 
 
It has been found that undercover operations are an effective manner to address 
organised crime and especially precious metals related crimes.  Undercover operations are 
an excellent barometer to determine the extent of organised crime.  It gives investigators a 
clear view of the compilation of a syndicate and the roles of leaders, runners and 
associates.  Informers are invaluable sources of information.  Without the use of informers 
it will be virtually impossible to engage in undercover operations, since the police will have 
no intelligence to engage into an investigation of this nature.  
 
The implications of the findings are that it is the responsibility of investigators, agents and 
informers to keep the system transparent, fair and acceptable. Their conduct may never 
violate their mandate and the boundaries of the investigation. Undercover operations are 
justified when the system is properly administered, structured, controlled and without bias. 
 
Key terms used during the research are: undercover operations, precious metals, agent, 
informer, forensic investigation and trap.  
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CHAPTER 1 
               
GENERAL ORIENTATION 
 
 
1.1 Introduction  
 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa stipulates under section 205(3) that 
the purpose of the South African Police Service (SAPS) is to prevent, investigate and 
combat crime (South Africa, 1996). It is indicated that investigation of crime is a 
reactive method of policing and that it is therefore the responsibility of the investigator 
to clear up crimes by making use of specific methods and techniques (Clarke, Cowley, 
de Klerk, Lamprecht, Mendes, Myburgh, van Schoor, van Zyl and Zinn, 2004:221).   
 
Broodryk, Joubert, Nel and Struwig (2001:323) indicate that informers are invaluable 
to the police to prevent and detect crime. Although the use of informers is an 
important link to address crime it remains a controversial issue, under specific 
circumstances.  With regards to organised crime, it is a well-known method to utilise 
informers in different roles during undercover operations.  It may vary from information 
gatherers to observers and agents.  
 
As discussed by Kriegler and Kruger (2002:636), the moral and lawful problems with 
traps and undercover operations accumulated over decades to the extent where the 
trapping system has been reviewed by the South African Law Commission during 
1994.  Broodryk et al. (201:324) indicate that evidence by informers will be 
approached with caution by courts and the cautionary rule will be applicable on their 
testimony. In S v Ohlenschläger 1992 (1) SACR 695 (T) the learned judge discussed 
the criticism against the system comprehensively.  The controversy over the use of 
traps and undercover operations were defused to a large extent with the adding of 
section 252(A) to the Criminal Procedure Act, Act 51 of 1977, which regulates the 
setting of traps and undercover operations.  
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The researcher from his own practical experience has identified the following 
problems with the use of informers: 
• Some informers play a double role and thereby promote their own interests 
and that of the syndicate they were supposed to infiltrate and expose.  Their 
actions prove to be detrimental to the criminal justice system as criminal cases 
are lost in courts due to the behaviour of informers. 
• Numerous problems occur during undercover precious metals operations 
when informers are utilised.  Informers exceed the boundaries of their 
mandate, informer handling is sub-standard, inferior control over informers 
and insufficient corroboration during evidence gathering. 
• Enticement by informers, who have lured suspects into committing crimes, has 
raised numerous criticisms by the judiciary in the past.  In S v Hayes and 
Another 1998 (1) SACR 625 (OPD) the conduct of the informer and agent 
went further than the creating of an opportunity to commit an offence.  The 
actions of the informer and agent led to the acquittal of the accused as the 
actions of the informer and agent violated the right of an accused to a fair trial, 
as enshrined in section 35 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. 
 
Because of all the problems with the use of informers during precious metals 
undercover operations the researcher decided to conduct research on the topic. The 
research was conducted during the time span of January to December 2008.  Despite 
of the problems associated with the utilisation of informers it is still regarded as an 
effective and efficient manner to address precious metals related criminal conduct.  It 
is therefore important to develop clear procedures to ensure that informers are 
correctly utilised during precious metals undercover operations. It will ensure that 
precious metals undercover operations are kept fair, transparent and without 
unwanted criticism.  
 
This chapter will further focus on the research methodology that was used to conduct 
the research.  Aspects such as aim and purpose of the research, the research design 
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and approach that were followed, sampling techniques and measurement instruments 
that were applied, data collection and analysis procedures that were followed, validity, 
reliability and ethical issues will be addressed.  It will enable the reader to understand 
precisely how the researcher verified answers to the research questions.    
 
 
1.2 Aim of the research 
 
The purpose of aims is to obtain new data and establish interesting patterns in the 
data as explained by Mouton (1996:103).  The aims of research should illustrate what 
the researcher wishes to establish through the research (Mouton, 1996:50).  The aim 
of this research is firstly to determine what undercover police operations entail and 
secondly to determine how informers should be used by police investigators during 
precious metals undercover operations.  These aims have enabled the researcher to 
make certain recommendations that can be used to improve on the procedures 
followed by investigators with informers during precious metals undercover operations.  
 
 
1.3 Purpose of the research 
 
According to Welman and Kruger (2002:18), the purpose of research is to define, 
explain and consequently predict or control human behaviour, its organisations and/or 
events. There must be a reason for doing the research, according to Denscombe 
(2002:25).  
 
Denscombe (2002:26-27) further explains that research can serve many purposes 
such as describing problems and explaining things. Application can be to analyse, 
evaluate or improve existing procedures.  Application is precisely what this research 
relates and pertains to - to determine how existing procedures with regard to the use 
of informers can be improved to enhance the performance of the police.  Other 
purposes according to Denscombe (2002:26-27), is to make predictions about future 
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behaviour and to empower those who are involved in the research.  This research 
aims to: 
 
• evaluate and analyse the use of informers during precious metals undercover 
operations 
• explore national and international literature sources to gather new and existing 
information on informers and undercover operations  
• correct and enhance procedures relating to the use of informers during 
precious metals undercover operations 
• empower and educate investigators who make use of informers during precious 
metals undercover operations. 
 
 
1.4 Research questions  
   
The following research questions specify what is to be investigated as explained by 
Denscombe (2002:31). Research questions are formulated to focus on the research 
problem that has been identified, Mouton (1996:53). 
• What do undercover police operations entail? 
• How could informers be used during undercover police operations? 
 
 
1.5 Key theoretical concepts 
 
The purpose of defining key concepts is to prevent any misunderstanding according to 
Leedy and Ormrod (2005:119).  For the purpose of this research the following key 
concepts are defined as follows: 
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1.5.1  Forensic investigation 
“Forensic investigation is an investigation aimed at instituting court 
proceedings, criminal as well as civil” (Lambrechts, 2001:93).  
 
1.5.2 Undercover operation 
According to Welch (2000:2) an undercover operation means “any operation to 
detect, investigate, uncover or prevent organised criminal conduct by using an 
official and/or his or her agent  
(a) for the purpose of which the official and/or his or her agent will be expected 
to use an assumed name or cover identity and to keep secret the fact that he or 
she is such official or agent; and 
(b) during the course of which it is reasonably foreseeable that the official  
and/or his or her agent may be expected to be involved in the commission of an 
offence or offences to ensure the success of the operation”. 
 
1.5.3 Informer 
“An informer can be generally defined as a person who provides information 
regarding criminals, criminal activities and/or specific criminal activities to an 
investigator for reward or other motives” (South African Police Service, 
c2004:2). 
 
1.5.4 Precious metals 
“The metal gold, any metal of the platinum group and the ores of such metals; 
and any other metal that the Minister has declared by notice in the Gazette to 
be a precious metal for the purposes of the Act, and the ores of any such 
metal” (Section 1 of the Precious Metals Act).  
 
1.5.5  Trap 
“Trap means a trap set either as an isolated event or as part of an undercover 
operation and includes the person involved in such trap” (Welch, 2000:2).  
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1.5.6  Agent 
“An agent is a person who with a view of securing the conviction of another 
proposes certain criminal conduct to the individual and he/she takes part in the 
operation thereof” (Welch, 2000:1).  
 
 
1.6 Research design and approach 
 
According to Mouton (2001:55), a research design is your plan of how you intend to 
conduct the research.  An empirical design has been used in this research as the 
focus is on human behaviour as explained by Mouton (2001:55). Denscombe (1998:6) 
describes empirical research as: “the getting out of the chair, going out of office and 
purposefully seeking for the information out there”. This study takes the form of 
empirical research as the researcher made use of interviews and the analysing of 
secondary data sources (Welman & Kruger, 2002:57). 
 
The qualitative research approach was used for this research.  According to Leedy 
and Ormrod (2005:133), the qualitative research approach focuses on phenomena 
that occur in their natural setting “real world”.  It involves the study of phenomena in all 
their complexity. Welman and Kruger (2002:178) state that it is advisable that when a 
researcher is concerned with explaining peoples’ behaviour, to conduct qualitative 
research, the latter is most suitable for the purpose of this research, since we are 
dealing with the behaviour of informers, agents and members of the South African 
Police Service during precious metals undercover operations.   
 
The qualitative research approach is presented in the form of a comprehensive 
literature study and semi-structured individual interviews. Semi-structured face-to-face 
interviews were conducted with thirty detectives of the SAPS who are making use of 
undercover operations.  Semi-structured face-to-face interviews were also conducted 
with five state advocates from the office of the Director of Public Prosecutions. 
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Although the collected data by means of interviews is subjectively collected, it will give 
the researcher a better understanding of the real life experience, thoughts, 
perceptions and behaviour of the participants during undercover operations. As 
discussed by Mouton (2001:71) the interviews are the primary data sources and the 
literature study provided the secondary data. 
 
 
1.7 Population and sampling 
 
Welman and Kruger (2002:46) indicate that the population refers to the study object, 
which may be individuals, groups, organisations, human products and events.  
 
The study or target population as explained by Maxfield and Babbie (1995:186) for the 
purpose of this research comprised of a group of police detectives who are members 
of the National Investigation Task Team which forms part of the Organised Crime 
Component of the South African Police Service (SAPS).  The team is accountable for 
the investigation of the most prevalent precious metals syndicates in South Africa and 
abroad.  The Team consisting of forty members was selected, because it is cost 
effective and convenient to the researcher who is a member of the task team.  
 
The team extensively make use of informers during undercover operations to 
neutralise and arrest these syndicates.  The team members are situated in Klerksdorp, 
Rustenburg and Johannesburg respectively.  Although the team members are situated 
in three cities, the team functions as a unit.  The National Investigation Task Team 
represents all users of precious metals undercover operations.  
 
As discussed by Welman and Kruger (2002:47), a probability sample will ensure that a 
representative sample is drawn from the population, where each member of the 
population has an equal opportunity to be selected.  The simple random sampling 
method as described by Leedy and Ormrod (2005:201) was used to ensure that each 
element has an equal chance of being selected.  The sampling frame therefore 
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consists of the names of thirty nine (39) members of the National Investigation Task 
Team, excluding the researcher.  A number was assigned to each person in the 
sampling frame and all the numbers were put in a box.  The researcher randomly 
picked thirty (30) numbers from the box, which ensured that each element had an 
equal chance of being selected. It prevented any bias in the selection process. Thirty 
(30) participants were selected, because it enabled the researcher to obtain sufficient 
knowledge about the subject under research. The thirty (30) participants are 
representative of the task team. The findings can be generalised for the entire 
population of thirty nine (39) detectives, since the majority of detectives participated in 
the research. There is a strong possibility that the findings can also be generalised for 
organised crime detectives who engage into precious metals operations, since they 
utilise the same methods to gather the required evidence. The findings cannot be 
generalised to all detectives, since detectives involved with general investigations do 
not make use of undercover operations to gather evidence. 
 
It was also decided to make use of the purposive sampling method as described by 
Leedy and Ormrod (2005:206) to select five state advocates from the office of the 
Director of Public Prosecutions Free State, which is situated in Bloemfontein.  These 
advocates are in the service of the state and they are responsible for the prosecution 
of organised crime cases, including precious metals investigations.   
 
The researcher decided upon the Bloemfontein advocates, because the researcher is 
au fait (well-acquainted) with the fact that these advocates are dealing with a 
considerable number of undercover operations relating to precious metals 
investigations.  It is convenient for the researcher to make use of these state 
advocates, since he frequently travels to Bloemfontein for official and personal 
purposes.  The five advocates were selected as a result of their extensive knowledge 
and experience of precious metals related and organised crime cases.    
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1.8 Data collection 
 
Maxfield and Babbie (2005:209) emphasise that the value of research depends on 
how the data is gathered.  The manner in which the data is collected will depend on 
the type of research and the purpose of the research.  In order to address the 
research objectives it was decided to gather the required data by means of interviews, 
literature and personal experience.  Mouton (2001:98-105) indicates that frequently 
used data collection methods in qualitative research include observation, interviewing 
and documentary sources.  
 
To ensure the validity of the data collection process, it was decided to make use of 
triangulation which refers to the use of multiple data sources as explained by Leedy 
and Ormrod (2005:99).  The researcher will not consider analysis of case dockets as 
information regarding undercover operations is not reflected in case dockets. 
   
1.8.1 Literature: 
  
The literature was obtained by visits to libraries where the researcher conducted 
research to gather information on the topic.  International and local sources such as 
books, journals, articles, newspapers, research dissertations and the Internet were 
consulted to obtain relevant information for the research.  To ensure that the data 
sources were dealt with in the same manner the researcher extracted the relevant 
information from the sources.  The contents and quotes were analysed by comparing 
the data to establish where the authors concur and where their views and findings 
differ. 
 
No literature with the same topic was found.  The researcher made use of literature 
that focus on methods and techniques to efficiently investigate crime.  Information 
relevant to undercover operations and informers was collected.  Data already 
gathered was obtained by visits to the Library at the UNISA Florida Campus, official 
South African Police Service directives and from documents that contains information 
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about informers and undercover operations.  These documents are in possession of 
the researcher and were built-up over a prolonged period of time.  
 
1.8.2 Interviews: 
 
With regards to interviews the researcher conducted semi-structured interviews as 
explained by (Mouton, 2001:105).  Semi-structured interviews gave the researcher the 
opportunity to obtain elaborative and comprehensive views of the participants.  The 
formulation of the questions was based on the research questions and aims of the 
research.  Thirty face-to-face, semi-structured individual interviews were conducted 
with the selected detectives.  
 
Semi-structured, face-to-face individual interviews were also conducted with the five 
advocates of the Director of Public Prosecutions.  The five advocates were selected 
as a result of their extensive knowledge and experience of precious metals related 
and organised crime cases.  The participant’s feedback consists of their individual 
knowledge, experience and perceptions.  Separate interview schedules were used for 
the detectives and advocates respectively, since all the questions are not applicable to 
the advocates.   
 
The answers of the participants were written down comprehensively by the 
researcher. Permission was obtained from the individuals and the respective 
institutions prior to conducting the interviews.  The interviews were conducted in 
privacy, after each of the participants had signed a letter of consent to continue 
voluntarily with the interview.  The participants were assured of their right to privacy 
and anonymity. 
 
The researcher made use of open-ended questions, since it gave the participants the 
opportunity to answer comprehensively.  The research questions under investigation 
guided the researcher during the selection of questions.  The researcher used current 
knowledge, practices and legislation to test the participant’s knowledge of the issues 
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under investigation.  This activated and motivated the participants to elaborate on their 
views. The interview schedules were tested by conducting interviews with precious 
metals detectives who were not involved in the research. After minor changes had 
been made, the final interview schedules were used during the research. Henceforth 
the interview schedules were approved by the supervisors. No problems were 
encountered during the interviews, since all the participants are conversant in English, 
since the interview schedules were compiled unambiguously.  The researcher has 
studied all the interview considerations as described by Leedy and Ormrod (2005:147) 
and adhered to them.    
 
1.8.3 Personal experience: 
 
The researcher has twenty years experience in the investigation of crime in the South 
African Police Service of which eighteen years within the organised crime fraternity.  
The researcher has extensive experience of the investigation of precious metals and 
diamond related offences, robbery and theft.  The researcher also has experience of 
money laundering, racketeering and asset forfeiture investigations and proceedings 
due to his involvement with the investigation of high profile precious metals 
syndicates.  
 
During the eighteen years within the precious metals domain the researcher has 
investigated in access of 2000 cases.  The researcher was involved with the execution 
and investigation of thirteen project driven undercover operations. Currently the 
researcher heads the Precious Metals and Diamond Section of the Organised Crime 
Unit Potchefstroom, where he is responsible to manage in access of 500 
investigations per annum.   
 
The researcher is the chairperson of the Regional Precious Metals Forum in 
Klerksdorp.  The forum is a joint initiative between the South African Police Service, 
the precious metals mining industry and the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA).  
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The function of the forum is to manage and co-ordinate the investigation of precious 
metals related crimes and to formulate and execute strategies on an operational level. 
 
The researcher obtained a National Diploma in Police Administration from Technikon 
SA during 1993 and a B-Tech degree in Forensic Investigation from UNISA during 
2006.  The researcher received internal as well as external training in the South 
African Police Service.  The following courses and training sessions were completed: 
Detective Course, Diamond and Gold Branch Course, Organised Crime Course, 
Officers Course, Project Management to Specialised Investigations, Money 
Laundering control in South Africa and the investigation of Racketeering related 
offences.   
 
 
1.9 Data analysis 
 
Maxfield and Babbie (2005:107) and Welman and Kruger (2002:195) point out that 
content analysis by means of decoding is the most suitable technique for qualitative 
research. Strydom and Delport (2001:336-342) are referring to strategies for data 
analysis.  All these theories agree that the following steps are of importance to 
effective data analysis and were therefore followed and executed by the researcher: 
• Analysis took place by studying, comparing, breaking up and grouping similar 
answers and literature together.  The remainder of the answers and literature 
were grouped into categories in the same manner. 
• Synthesis was reached by combining the analysed data into a whole. 
• Induction took place by incorporating known facts into the research to set a 
general rule.  Legislation and reported cases falls within this category. 
• Deduction was accomplished by studying all the facts (interviews, literature and 
personal experience) and as a result thereof arrived at answers for the 
research questions.  
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The data from the interviews and documentary sources were compared, analysed, 
and coded to establish what the degree of comparison is between the participant’s 
versions.  The obtained data was compared with the literature to point out differences 
and to establish trends and patterns.  A combination of the above-mentioned 
approaches insured that the data was analysed comprehensively and efficiently. 
 
 
1.10 Methods taken to ensure validity 
 
According to Leedy and Ormrod (2005:28), “validity of an instrument is the extent to 
which the instrument measures what it is suppose to measure”.  Denscombe 
(2002:100) indicates that validity is concerned with the accuracy of the questions 
asked, the data collected and the explanation offered.  Generally it relates to the data 
and the analysis used in the research.  
 
The research questions and aims of the research determined the contents of the 
interview schedules.  A standard interview schedule was used for all the detective 
participants.  All this ensured that the questions measured what they were supposed 
to measure.  During the interviews with detectives the same questions were put to all 
participants. The process was replicated with each participant, which ensured and 
maintained quality throughout.  During the interviews the researcher endeavoured to 
maintain control and to remain focused on the scope of and research questions of the 
research. 
  
A shortened interview schedule was used in respect of the advocates, since many of 
the questions asked from the detectives were irrelevant to the advocates.  The 
interview dealt with operational aspects of which the advocates have no experience.  
The same process was repeated with all the advocates, which in turn assured quality 
throughout. The researcher maintained control by focusing on the scope of and 
research questions of the research.  
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Data obtained by means of interviews were merged with literature and personal 
experience to ensure trustworthiness.  Sample validity was ensured by making use of 
a representative sample of thirty detectives.  The five advocates were selected by 
means of purposive sampling, as a result of their extensive knowledge and experience 
of precious metals related and organised crime cases.  Collection validity was ensured 
by subjecting all the participants to the same process.  The participants were allowed 
to complete the interview in an environment chosen by them where they were able to 
concentrate and respond freely. The triangulation approach which refers to the use of 
more than one method to obtain data as discussed by Leedy and Ormrod (2005:99) 
was used to strengthen the trustworthiness of the data. 
  
 
1.11 Methods taken to ensure reliability 
 
Maxfield and Babbie (2005:129) and Mouton and Marais (1992:81) agree that 
reliability means that obtained results must be replicable if the same research is 
conducted by another researcher.  
 
The semi-structured interview schedules ensured consistency throughout the 
interviews with regard to qualitative data collection.  The interview schedules were 
compiled by referring to the research questions as sub-headings.  The relevant 
questions were then included into the respective sub-sections of the interview 
schedule.  The researcher ensured confidentiality by conducting the interviews in 
privacy.  The interviewer did not lead the respondents to answer in a specific manner, 
thus not leading them in a specific direction.  The answers to the questions were 
comprehensively noted to ensure an accurate record of the interviews.  This ensured 
that when different researchers conduct the same research by means of the same 
interview schedules as measurement tools they will obtain the same results. 
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1.12 Ethical considerations 
 
Mouton (2001:238) sensitises post graduate students to adhere to the principles and 
rules of ethics during research.  The author stresses the importance of maintaining 
morally accepted norms and values in scientific research.  The researcher is cognisant 
of the requirements and attempted to adhere to it at all times.  Amongst others, the 
researcher assured the participants that answers and comments were treated 
confidentially and that their views will not be questioned in future. Anonymity will be 
protected and the researcher encouraged the participants to answer frank on the 
questions posed to them. 
 
According to Leedy and Ormrod (2005:101-103), it is imperative for researchers to 
adhere to the following ethical issues during research: 
• Obtain informed consent.  Voluntary participation is a prerequisite.  Participants 
should be given sufficient information concerning the research to be able to 
make an informed decision.  The researcher gave the participants a 
comprehensive synopsis of the nature of the research, after which the 
necessary consent was obtained in writing. 
• Protect the participants from harm.  The researcher endeavoured to conduct 
the interviews under circumstances where the participants were comfortable 
and not exposed to stress or embarrassment.  
• The right to privacy should be respected.  No responses by a participant should 
be disclosed in a manner that exposes the specific participant, unless the 
participant agrees in writing to disclosure.  The researcher allocated a code 
number to each of the participants to honour their privacy. 
• Honesty with professional colleagues.  Researchers may not fabricate data to 
support a specific finding.  The researcher was cognisant of the requirement to 
ensure that all sources are acknowledged to refrain from committing plagiarism. 
• Sources consulted.  Reference was made to all sources incorporated in the 
research by including them into the list of references. 
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According to the South African Police Service National Instruction 1/2006, the purpose 
of the instruction is to regulate applications by civilians and members of the South 
African Police Service who would like to conduct research for private purposes (South 
African Police Service, 2006:5).  The instruction sets out the procedure to be followed 
in order to obtain the necessary authority.  The instruction was adhered to and the 
required authorisation was granted by the Provincial Commissioner North West.  A 
copy of the authorisation is attached as per “Annexure D”.    
 
 
1.13 Research structure 
  
To ensure that the research report is well-structured, that the content follows a logical 
order and that the research aims and questions are addressed, the chapters are 
outlined as follows: 
 
Chapter 2:  Undercover Police Operations 
In this chapter, the main focus is on undercover operations.  It explains the legal 
framework for this covert investigation technique, the justification thereof and criticism 
against the system.  The chapter devotes time to the phases of undercover operations 
and attempts to describe the relationship between undercover operations and forensic 
investigation.    
 
Chapter 3:  The use of informers during undercover police operations 
In this chapter, the main focus is on how to use informers during undercover police 
operations.  The chapter describe different types of informers, their motives for giving 
information and roles that informers may fulfil during undercover operations.  The 
informer privilege and aspects that need consideration when making use of informers 
during undercover operations are discussed comprehensively.  
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Chapter 4: The conclusion 
This chapter will inform the reader of what was discovered during the research and will 
relate to the aims and research questions on which the findings and recommendations 
are based. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
UNDERCOVER POLICE OPERATIONS  
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The word “detective” originated in 1853 when it was referred to the Scotland Yard 
investigators in that manner (Gilbert, 2004:9).  According to the New English Usage 
Dictionary (2001:216), detection means: “finding out, discovering and exposing”. It is 
clear that the importance and need for proper investigations was already recognised 
in the 19th
 
 century. 
According to Tilley (2005:178), investigative techniques and the development thereof 
focuses on the finding of guilt and the allocation of blame.  The prevention of similar 
crimes stands secondary to the main purpose of clearing up crime.  Tilley (2005:171) 
is of the belief that the use of science in policing techniques may lead to crime 
reduction where there are scientific endeavours to control crime.    
 
Marais and Van Rooyen (1990:149) indicate that undercover operations are a 
universal accepted method at the disposal of the police to investigate certain criteria of 
criminal behaviour.  Van der Westhuizen (1996:88) honours the opinion that 
undercover operations refer to the actions of people who are generally referred to as 
spies, informers or secret agents.   
 
Van der Westhuizen (1996:88) and Clarke et al. (2004:332) emphasise that 
undercover operations are utilised in respect of consensual crimes or so-called 
“victimless” crimes such as the illegal dealing in gold.  Broodryk et al. (2001:320) 
agree with van der Westhuizen and indicate that the method is in particular effective to 
address organised crime.  Welch (2000:1) refers to organised criminal conduct as: 
“criminal conduct or an endeavour thereto by any enterprise or group of persons who 
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have a common goal in committing crimes of whatever nature in an organised 
manner”.  
  
During the process of the investigation of crime it is important to differentiate between 
overt and covert techniques.  Overt techniques refer to conventional police methods to 
gather evidence, such as for instance the obtaining of a witness statement.  
Undercover operations is a covert technique as the investigation is conducted in 
secrecy and the suspects are not aware of the fact that they are being investigated for 
organised crime related offences (Broodryk et al., 2001:320).  
 
This chapter will further focus on important aspects with regard to forensic 
investigations and undercover operations.  The chapter will also reflect on criticism 
against undercover operations and conclude with a discussion on legal aspects to 
consider ensuring that undercover operations are fair and within the boundaries of the 
law. 
 
 
2.2 Meaning of forensic and criminal investigation 
 
Marais and Van Rooyen (1990:17) and Lee, Palmbach and Miller (2001:16) indicate 
that the investigation of crime: “is a scientific and systematic search for the truth with 
the purpose of clearing up the committed crime”. Marais (1992:1) discusses the 
meaning comprehensively and states that criminal investigation is the lawful tracing of 
humans and objects.  It directly and indirectly contributes to the reconstruction of a 
crime scene by conveying information regarding the persons involved in the crime.  
 
Collins Thesaurus A-Z Discovery (2005:152) defines criminal as: “unlawful, illicit, 
wrong, illegal, corrupt, crooked, felonious, immoral etc.”.  Investigation is defined by 
Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary (2000: 632) as: “carefully examine the facts of a 
situation, an event or a crime; to find out the truth about it”.  The New English Usage 
Dictionary (2001:435) defines investigation as: “an enquiry or research”. Monk (1998: 
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56) defines crime as: “any act committed in violation of a law that prohibits it and 
authorises punishment for its commission”. 
 
It is the experience of the researcher that the investigation of crime is conducted 
according to tested and trusted investigative methods and techniques in order to 
ensure that evidence is complete and orderly gathered to pass the test of admissibility 
in court.  Schmalleger (2005:237) defines criminal investigation as: “The process of 
discovering, collecting, preparing, identifying and presenting evidence to determine 
what happened and who is responsible when a crime occurs”.  According to McDevitt 
(2005:5-7), the investigation of crime is a process that commences at the reporting of 
the crime and is only completed after the accused is convicted or the case is 
concluded due to some or another reason.  Gilbert (2004:64) explains that the process 
consists of three phases namely: 
• The preliminary investigation. Reporting of the crime, crime scene 
management and the gathering of evidence from the crime scene. 
• In depth investigation. Comprehensive investigation of the matter by obtaining 
witness statements, forensic reports and identifying the suspects.  
• Final investigation. Arrest of the perpetrator and submitting the comprehensive 
case docket to court for litigation purposes. 
 
According to Van der Westhuizen (1996:9), forensic refers to a specific competency 
that is aimed at providing law enforcement with specific scientific knowledge.  The 
author honours the opinion that the scientific approach evolved even before the 
establishment of the South African Police in 1913.  Lambrechts (2001:93) explains 
that forensic investigation is aimed at the instituting of court proceedings, both for 
criminal and civil litigation.  The author emphasises that scientific knowledge must be 
applied to a legal problem to be classified as a forensic investigation. According to the 
New English Usage Dictionary (2001:318), forensic is defined as: “used in a court of 
law or in the tracking of criminals”. 
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Saferstein (1990:1) and Van der Westhuizen (1996:9) concur that forensic science 
depicts the application of science onto law.  Erzinglioglo (2000:14) is of the opinion 
that forensic investigation deals with a specific manner of thinking.  A rational way of 
thinking is important, as it will determine which method or technique will be utilised to 
address the crime to be investigated.  Forensic (2009) directs that the word forensic 
stems from the Latin word “Forum” and it means related to courts.  Forensic refers to a 
broad spectrum of sciences to answer questions of interest to the legal system.  
According to Swanson, Chamelin and Territo (2003:3), forensic methods and 
techniques are utilised during the investigative process in order to gather evidence 
and information.  
 
From the interviews conducted with the thirty (30) detective participants it became 
apparent that the participants have an idea about what the meaning of forensic 
investigation entails, although the participants do not know the exact meaning.  
Sixteen (16) participants referred to an in-depth investigation with the aim to institute 
criminal proceedings whilst nine (9) participants were of the opinion that forensic 
investigations have a scientific base.  The remaining five (5) participants have the 
perception that forensic investigation is a financial investigation.    
 
The researcher is of the opinion, based on the literature, the participant’s views and 
his experience as a forensic investigator, that forensic investigation and criminal 
investigation is analogue to each other as both investigations are aimed at instituting 
court proceedings.  The difference between the two concepts lies therein that the 
application of scientific knowledge is a pre-requisite for an investigation to be 
classified as a forensic investigation. The researcher agrees with Lambrechts 
(2001:93) in this regard. In recent years the private and corporate environment started 
to play an important role in conducting investigations.  Almost all private and corporate 
companies refer to their investigation units as forensic investigation units.  The South 
African Police Service used to refer to their investigations as criminal investigations, 
but recently started to use the new term of forensic investigations. 
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2.3 A scientific approach towards crime investigation    
 
Vold, Bernard and Snipes (1998:317) emphasise that the investigation of crime is 
based on a scientific approach towards the problem of crime and that the approach 
must be advanced to the benefit of the science. The New English Usage Dictionary 
(2001: 771) defines science as: “Knowledge gained by the observation of natural laws 
and behaviour and arranged according to a system”.  It is clear that the word 
“scientific” is the key word for this section of the chapter.  The question is which 
science is applicable to the investigation of crime? 
 
According to Van der Westhuizen (1996:353), “proven legal principles provide an 
acceptable point of departure for a discussion on the science of criminal investigation”.  
Gilbert (2004:560) states that more cases will be solved if evidence processing was 
more complete.  The author is of the opinion that specialised crime scene processing 
will resolve the problem.  The author’s point of view is that a scientific approach with 
well-trained personnel is needed to locate and effectively gather maximum evidence 
and clues from a crime scene. 
 
Van der Westhuizen (1996:357) argues that successfully prosecuted and convicted 
cases has improved substantially, since the South African Police Service adopted a 
scientific approach towards criminal investigation.  This has led to the utilisation of 
scientific methods, techniques, models and resources. 
• Examples of forensic methods: 
- Undercover operations 
- Informer management 
- Interviewing 
• Examples of forensic techniques: 
- Ballistics 
- Questioned documents 
- Toxicology 
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The experience and training of the researcher as a forensic investigator, directs that 
organised crime is successfully addressed by means of a project driven approach 
where covert techniques such as undercover operations and informers are utilised to 
eliminate and investigate the specific threat.  Knipe, van der Walt, van Niekerk, Burger 
and Nell (2002:9) reason that project management is a science, since it is supported 
by charts, graphs, mathematical calculations and other technical tools.   
 
Carlen and Morgan (1999:64) are of the opinion that due to the seriousness of crime, 
the police had to change their existing reactive methods and techniques.  They further 
explained that sophisticated covert techniques, databases and meaningful research 
have contributed towards effective criminal investigation.  A scientific approach laid 
the cornerstone for the development and expansion of existing and new methods and 
techniques. Gilbert (2004:565) indicates that continuous and meaningful research will 
be necessary to expand investigative capacity and to provide competent investigators.  
Investigative research seeks to test or discover various areas of inquiry important to 
criminal investigators. 
 
James and Nordby (2005:15-635) lists the following examples of forensic investigation 
methods that have a scientific baseline: 
• Forensic Pathology 
• Forensic Toxicology 
• Forensic Entomology 
• Evaluation of the crime scene 
• Forensic Psychology, Forensic Psychiatry (Social sciences) 
• DNA analysis 
• Questioned documents  
• Cyber Technology  
 
Gilbert (2004:552) indicates that a scientific approach will empower investigators to 
project future trends by considering past occurrences and present developments. 
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According to Gilbert (2004:554-555), innovative law enforcement will result in the 
development of more effective investigative techniques. 
 
From the research and views of the above-mentioned authors it has become apparent 
that the wide scope of the science under which, for instance, the natural science, 
economical science, cyber science, social science and forensic science resorts, finds 
application within the science of forensic investigation.  The ingenuity and 
perseverance of investigators and researchers will determine how successful they are 
in the application of science to the investigation of crime.    
 
 
2.4 Objectives of forensic investigation 
 
It is important to devote attention to the objectives of forensic investigation as it will 
direct investigators to concentrate and pay attention to the relevant and important 
aspects of forensic investigation.  It will contribute to obtain the required results with 
the investigation of crime.  McDevitt (2005:3-5), Marais and Van Rooyen (1990:17) 
and Marais (1992:1) agree that the primary objective of criminal investigations is to 
arrest criminals after sufficient evidence has been gathered.  
 
The thirty (30) detective participants remarked as followed on the objectives of 
forensic investigation.  Twenty one (21) participants referred to evidence gathering as 
paramount to ensure that justice is served.  Nine (9) participants referred to a myriad 
of answers including the seizure of exhibits, to recover stolen property, successful 
prosecutions and the reconstruction of a crime scene.  This is indicative of their own 
experience and knowledge of the objectives of forensic investigations. 
 
Persad and Joubert (2001:225), Lyman (2002:14), Marais and Van Rooyen (1990:19), 
Smit, Minnaar and Schnetler (2004:161) and van der Westhuizen (1996:4) corroborate 
the statement by McDevitt (2005:3-5), Marais and Van Rooyen (1990:17) and Marais 
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(1992:1) and the detective participants and they agree that the following secondary 
objectives are important for effective investigation: 
• Make a decision on whether a crime was committed or not.  For example: Was 
it murder or did the deceased commit suicide? 
• Identify the crime that was committed.  It is important to correctly identify the 
crime. It may influence the immediate and follow-up investigations as decisions 
must be taken on specific methods and or techniques to be utilised to clear up 
the crime incident.  A thorough and effective investigation of the crime scene is 
therefore important to correctly identify the committed crime. 
• Gather evidence.  As the crime scene is predominantly a reliable source of 
evidence it is important to comprehensively gather evidence from this 
important source.  It is important for investigators to know that eye witnesses, 
exhibits, informers and technological evidence are amongst numerous other 
sources important sources of evidence. 
• Gather intelligence.  Investigators need to be cognisant that intelligence is the 
end product of information that was processed, verified and evaluated to a 
usable product. Intelligence is not per se evidence. 
• Recover stolen property. 
• Prevent crime. 
• Individualise the perpetrator(s).  
• Arrest the suspect(s). 
• Connect the suspect(s) to similar offences. 
• Involvement during the litigation process. 
 
The above discussion has outlined the most important objectives, which will properly 
guide investigators in their search for the truth. The detective participants have 
adequate knowledge of the objectives of forensic investigations to properly guide them 
during the investigative process. From the discussion it has become clear that the 
investigation of precious metals related offences by means of undercover operations 
and utilising informers are in line with the objectives of forensic investigation.  An 
undercover operation is a forensic method to gather evidence, to recover stolen 
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property (precious metals) and to identify and arrest the perpetrator. The use of 
informers during these undercover operations serves the purpose of gathering 
evidence and intelligence.    
 
 
2.5 Meaning of undercover operation 
 
New English Usage Dictionary (2001:969) defines undercover as: “acting secretly, 
acting as a spy”. Collins Thesaurus A-Z Discovery (2005:745) elaborates more on the 
meaning and defines undercover as: “secret, covert, clandestine, private, hidden, 
intelligence, underground, spy, concealed, confidential”. It is clear from the definitions 
that secrecy and spying is integral to undercover operations. 
 
Ashcroft (2002:1) describes an undercover operation as a series of related undercover 
activities that is conducted over a period of time.  Mention is made that these 
operations are operational for at least six to twelve months.  Welch (2000:2) defines 
an undercover operation as: “any operation to detect, investigate, uncover or prevent 
organised criminal conduct by using an official and/or his or her agent: 
• For the purpose of which the official and/or his or her agent will be expected to   
use an assumed name or cover identity and to keep secret the fact that he or 
she is such official or agent  
• During the course of which it is reasonably foreseeable that the official and /or 
his or her agent may be expected to be involved in the commission of an 
offence or offences to ensure the success of the operation”.   
 
All five (5) advocate participants share the opinion that undercover operations have 
the following characteristics: 
• It is an unconventional method to gather evidence in respect of organised 
criminal activities. 
• Agents are used to infiltrate and expose syndicates. 
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• The method is used to combat crime which can not be addressed effectively by 
means of conventional investigative methods. 
 
The thirty (30) detective participants were requested to state what they understand of 
the concept undercover operation.  Their responses were summarised and they 
associated the following characteristics with undercover operations: 
• Secrecy is the key word. 
• Undercover agents are used to infiltrate and expose organised crime 
syndicates. 
• Controlled deliveries and purchases forms part of undercover operations. 
• Undercover operations are medium to long term investigations. 
• Agents who act bona fide will be indemnified against prosecution. 
 
Based on the literature consulted, experience of the researcher and the views of the 
participants the researcher is of the opinion that an undercover operation is a covert 
investigative method to expose, detect and investigate crimes committed in secrecy by 
means of agents who ostensibly participate in the identified crime(s) to gather 
evidence against identified suspects.  According to Broodryk et al. (2001:335), an 
undercover operation and a trap is analog to each other. Welch (2000:2) defines a 
trap as: “set either as an isolated event or as part of an undercover operation and 
includes the person involved in such a trap”.     
 
The thirty (30) detective participants were requested to give their opinion on whether 
an undercover operation is analog to a trap.  Twenty three (23) participants embraced 
the view that an undercover operation is in fact a trap, although a trap is a single event 
where the suspect is arrested directly after the transaction has been concluded. 
Seven (7) participants remarked that it is not similar concepts. They are of the opinion 
that an undercover operation is an ongoing process to gather evidence against 
syndicate role players.      
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The detective and advocate participants view an undercover operation as an 
operation that is an ongoing process where evidence is gathered over a prolonged 
period of time, before the termination and arrest of the syndicate role players.  From 
the discussion it became clear that an undercover operation is not per se a trap, 
because undercover operations include traps and other methods to gather evidence 
against syndicate role players.  
 
 
2.6. Background and justification for undercover operations  
 
2.6.1 Historical background 
 
According to Naudé (1999:21), the first trap is found in the Bible in Genesis 3:13 and it 
reads as follows: “The Lord, God asked the woman, why did you do this? She replied 
the snake tricked me into eating it”. Marais and Van Rooyen (1990:150) indicate that 
undercover operations came into existence in South Africa after the discovery of 
diamonds in 1882. The discovery led to serious crime threats concerning the illicit 
dealing in uncut diamonds.  These escalating crimes influenced government to 
enforce a method to restore law and order.  
 
In the case of Meyers & Misnum v Rex TS 1907 the court approved of the trapping 
(undercover operation) system to investigate crime. The Judge remarked as follows: 
“It is well that the court should in these trapping cases do all that in it lies to see that 
no restrictions are relaxed by the police who have charge of the operations”. The 
researcher believes that the remark by the Judge unambiguously directed that 
undercover operations are to be transparent and fairly set by the police.   
 
Lambrechts (2005:680) remarks that undercover operations were regulated previously 
in the South African law by the general principles of the law.  This meant that if 
evidence before court is credible and admissible the accused would be convicted.  
The situation changed during 1996 with the adding of section 252(A) to the Criminal 
Procedure Act, Act 51 of 1977. Section 252(A) of the Criminal Procedure Act, Act 51 
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of 1977 now judicially regulates undercover operations in South Africa (South Africa, 
1977: sec. 252(A)).  
 
2.6.2 Justification for the system 
 
According to Carlen and Morgan (1999:64) and Wright (2006:188), police resorted to 
proactive intelligence driven strategies to effectively address organised crime as 
traditional reactive methods are fragmented and insufficient.  Carlen and Morgan 
(1999:64) are of the opinion that sophisticated covert techniques such as undercover 
police officers can successfully gain control over organised crime.  Covert techniques 
are essential as it could reduce the growth and development of organised crime.  In its 
report the Commission of Inquiry (1994:11) corroborate their belief and state that due 
to the nature of syndicate activities and their role in serious crime, such as the illicit 
dealing in gold, it is necessary to make use of undercover operations.  It is an effective 
method to combat illegal activities and it is recognised throughout the world. 
 
With regards to the use of informers and undercover operations Broodryk et al. 
(2001:320-324) and Nel and Bezuidenhout (1997:364-370) are in agreement that it is 
an effective and necessary method to investigate and address organised crime or the 
so-called “victimless crimes”, of which the theft of precious metals is a major problem 
in South Africa. Overt techniques are not appropriate as no smuggler will admit his or 
her involvement to organised crime.  Overt techniques refer to conventional 
investigative methods like for instance interrogation and to obtain a witness statement. 
 
In S v Pule 1996 (2) SACR 604 (O) the Judge ruled that undercover operations is an 
indispensable tool to gather evidence against perpetrators during and after the 
undercover operation, since criminals are sly and they operate sophistically.  In S v 
Tsochlas 1974 (1) SA 565 (A) the Supreme Court of Appeal ruled that undercover 
operations (traps) is a means of controlling illicit diamond dealing, since it is 
detrimental to the diamond industry and the fiscus. Lambrechts (2005:681) is of the 
opinion that the Tsochlas decision is likewise applicable to precious metals.  
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Prince (2006:12) shows that history was made when the first accused was convicted 
on racketeering charges in South Africa, after his illegal dealing in uncut diamonds 
were investigated by means of an undercover operation over a prolonged period of 
time.  This is a striking example of how successful syndicate leaders can be brought to 
book by means of an undercover operation.  Prince (2006:12) agrees with Albanese 
(2004:15) by mentioning that a successful undercover operation can produce 
convictions and disrupt syndicates entirely.  
 
According to Marais and Van Rooyen (1990:154), the application of undercover 
operations is justified and in the interest of the community, when other methods and 
techniques are not suitable under the circumstances.  The author is of the opinion that 
the following considerations are important in deciding if undercover operations are 
justifiable: 
• Interest of community. The community at large expects from the police to 
address crime effectively. The South African Police Service will adhere to 
the obligation placed on them by the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, Act 108 of 1996 to combat crime.   
• Nature of the offence(s).  
• Preventative value. The utilisation of undercover operations will discourage 
intentional perpetrators to conclude illegal activities. 
 
Naudé (1999:13-16) has pointed out that the following arguments are made on behalf 
of undercover operations: 
• There must be a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct against the 
suspect.  It is the experience of the researcher that an affidavit based on 
facts will suffice to create the suspicion. 
• Serious crime must be committed or planned. Examples: Organised crime 
and murder. 
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• Responsible, credible organisations and persons with a good character 
must lead these investigations, for instance the South African Police 
Service.  
• The principle that those who are guilty of committing crime must be 
punished is applicable here. 
 
Kleinig (1996:152) and Naudé (1999:13-16) concur by remarking that undercover 
operations are justified under circumstances where the suspect would have committed 
the said offence in any event even if there were no intervention by the state.  Marais 
and Van Rooyen (1990:154) comment that undercover operations are justifiable 
against individuals who commit the said offence(s) on a regular and ongoing basis.  
 
S v Dube 2000 (1) SASV 53 (N) is an excellent example of where the accused were 
actively and continuously involved in criminal conduct before the undercover operation 
commenced.  The court ruled that the accused would have committed the offence, 
even if an undercover operation had not been set for the accused.  Therefore the 
undercover operation only served as an instrument to conclude the transaction and to 
gather evidence against the accused.  
   
Albanese (2004:13) honours the opinion that undercover operations and the use of 
informers are necessitated, as it can contribute towards determining if and to what 
extent links exists with organised crime.  Albanese (2004:13) is in agreement with 
Buckwalter (1983:128) by adding that undercover operations is the tool to gather 
evidence that could not otherwise be obtained.  
 
In a recent verdict by the High Court in S v Thinta and Others 2006 (1) SACR 4 (ECD) 
it was ruled that undercover operations are an acceptable method to gather evidence 
and exhibits.  The Judge indicated that it is in the interest of justice to gather all 
evidence before terminating an operation.  In the matter the South African Police 
Service purchased firearms from the accused over a prolonged period of time before 
arresting him. 
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The advocate participants were requested to state if undercover operations is an 
effective manner to address precious metals related crimes? All five (5) advocate 
participants agreed that undercover operations are especially an effective method to 
combat precious metals related crimes.  One of the advocates made the striking 
remark that criminal trials over many years practically illustrated that undercover 
operations are an important and effective instrument to combat precious metals 
related crimes.  The following reasons were offered to prove their views: 
• It is the only effective method to gather evidence and prosecute syndicate king 
pins. 
• Conventional methods will not suffice, since these syndicates are well 
organised and sophisticated in the execution of their illegal operations. 
• Undercover operations aids towards the infiltration of the inner circle of 
syndicates to gather court driven evidence.  
 
The same question was put forward to the thirty (30) detective participants.  All the 
participating detectives agreed that undercover operations are an effective method to 
address precious metals related crimes.  These detectives added the following as 
corroboration for the views of the advocates: 
• The method is effective to address the “faceless” money suppliers and 
launderers, because they have a hands-off approach.  
• Undercover operations give investigators a holistic view of the compilation of a 
syndicate and the respective roles of the leaders, runners and associates. 
• Undercover operations give investigators the opportunity to successfully 
address all the role players within a syndicate hierarchy, from the lower 
echelon to the syndicate leaders. 
• The method is effective, because the stolen precious metals can be recovered 
from the perpetrators.  
  
From the discussion it is clear that the participating detectives and advocates, as 
substantiated by Marais and Van Rooyen (1990:154), Naudé (1999:13-16), Kleinig 
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(1996:152) and Albanese (2004:13) are of the opinion that the application of 
undercover operations are justified to control serious organised crime.  
As a result of the afore-mentioned research the researcher strongly believes that the 
golden threat towards fair undercover operations is that the idea to commit serious 
crime must be born from the mind of the suspect.  A reasonable suspicion must exist 
against such a person before an undercover operation may be launched against the 
syndicate.  
 
 
2.7. Criticism against undercover operations 
 
As discussed by Kriegler and Kruger (2002:636), the moral and lawful problems with 
traps and undercover operations accumulated over decades up to the point where the 
trapping system was reviewed by the South African Law Commission during 1994.  In 
its report the Commission of Inquiry (1994:12) indicated that the community at large is 
of the opinion that undercover operations are set arbitrarily to catch whoever can be 
led into temptation.    
 
The report on the Commission of Inquiry (1994:5) reports that Judge Van Heerden 
and his committee had to decide on the following aspects: 
• The application of the trapping system in South Africa. 
• Whether there is justification and a need for the system as a method of 
investigating crime. 
• Is there sufficient control over undercover operations? 
• What effect will a future human rights dispensation in South Africa have on the 
use of undercover operations? 
 
Naudé (1999:20) indicates that the source of the criticism against undercover 
operations is vested in the application of the trapping system and not as such with the 
system itself.  The author states that deception is used as technique to be successful 
with the proactive conduct by the South African Police Service.  Lyman (2006:13) 
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cautions that although undercover operations are an effective manner to address 
serious crimes, protocol needs to be developed to eliminate unacceptable tactics 
during the investigative phase.  
 
In S v Ohlenschläger 1992 (1) SACR 695 (T) the learned judge discussed the criticism 
against the system comprehensively and remarked that agents commit offences in 
many instances.  The Judge added that the authorities need to decide to what extent 
the police are mandated to trap offenders in a criminal manner and manufacture 
offences in the name of combating crime.   
 
Enticement by informers who has lured unwary suspects into committing crimes, 
raised numerous criticism by the judiciary in the past.  In S v Hayes and Another 1998 
(1) SACR 625 (OPD) the conduct of the informer and agent went beyond the creating 
an opportunity to commit an offence.   Their actions led to the acquittal of the 
appellants on appeal, as the actions of the informer and agent violated the right of an 
accused to a fair trial, as enshrined in section 35 of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, Act 108 of 1996. 
 
In S v Nortjé 1996 (2) SACR 308 (CPD) the appellant was arrested for the illegal 
dealing in uncut diamonds. She had a previous conviction for a similar offence.  The 
appellant argued that she had been enticed by the informer to illicit diamond dealing.  
The informer did not testify in the case.  The court of appeal ruled that the conviction 
and sentence were set aside as the court was satisfied that the appellant was enticed 
into illegal diamond dealing.  
 
Kleinig (1996:153-159) argues that a distinction must be drawn between “unwary 
innocent suspects” and “unwary criminals” when determining whether a person is 
culpable of committing an offence during an undercover operation.  If it is found that 
the disposition was to implant the offence in the mind of the innocent person, then the 
defendant is not culpable.  Lambrechts (2005:690) concur with Kleinig (1996: 153-
159) by stating that the initiative to commit the offence must come from the side of the 
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accused, not from the side of the agent or informer.  The undercover operation must 
therefore be the result of the creative activity by the accused and not of the agent or 
informer. 
 
In R v Clever 1967 (4) SA 256 (RA) the Judge ruled that the temptation affected by 
the trap must not be greater than the temptation which normally exists.  Schmalleger 
(2005:166) and Madinger (2000:208) indicate that entrapment is a defence in the 
United States of America, when the criminal activity originates by the agent and or 
informer.  Schmalleger (2005:166) and Madinger (2000:208) further stress that it is not 
entrapment when the agent merely provided an opportunity to the willing offender to 
commit a crime. 
 
Clarke et al. (2004:336), Naudé (1999:16-20) and Welch (2000:1) comprehensively 
discuss the problems with the application of undercover operations. The identified 
areas are as follows: 
• Deception is used to lure suspects into illegal transactions.  A trap is a person 
with a view of securing the conviction of another, proposes certain criminal 
conduct to the person, and the trap ostensibly takes part therein.  That depicts 
that since the agent or trap has a motive to obtain a conviction he or she can 
easily unfairly influence an individual into committing crime.  The conduct of the 
agent and or informer favours the prosecution.     
• Informers are dubious characters who are themselves involved in criminal 
activities. 
• The authorities must combat crime, not create it. 
• The poor and needy and mentally deficient are approached by the police. 
• Undercover operations violate individual’s right to privacy and freedom of 
expression.   
 
Furthermore Lambrechts (2005:686) and Naudé (1999:16-20) concur with Marais and 
Van Rooyen (1990:156-157) and add that the following aspects also need 
consideration as founded criticism against undercover operations: 
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• Fabrication of evidence.  
• Police corruption.  The Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Justice 
recommended during 1993 that legislation needed to be passed to regulate 
undercover operations due to high levels of police corruption. 
• Abuse of the judicial process.  Based on the comments by the authors the 
researcher is of the opinion that the SAPS has an obligation to ensure that 
only experienced, well trained and responsible investigators are entrusted to 
conduct undercover operations.  
 
Madinger (2000:208) indicates that undercover operations will be fairly set by ensuring 
that no unreasonable temptation “entrapment” takes place.  The question posed to the 
advocate participants was: “What measures they implement to ensure that undercover 
operations are fairly set?”. The five advocates gave a combination of the following 
answers:  
• Strict boundaries must be set for the conduct of the agent(s) and informer.  
• Regular contact between the assigned advocate, handler, investigator, informer 
and agent. 
• Compliance with section 252(A) of the Criminal Procedure Act, Act 51 of 1977. 
• The handler must have sufficient control over the informer and agent. 
• The conduct of the agents and informers must not go beyond the creating of an 
opportunity to commit an offence. 
The same question was posed to the thirty (30) detective participants. An array of 
answers was given of which the following were mentioned the most frequently:  
• Corroborative evidence must be gathered.  
• Obtain section 252(A) of the Criminal Procedure Act, Act 51 of 1977 
authorisation.  
• Proper communication channels and control measures over the agent.  
• Proper training of the informer, agent, handler and investigator on legal 
aspects.  
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When the views of the authors, reported judgements and participants were studied it 
became eminent that the criticism against the trapping system has merit, due to the 
actions of informers and agents during the application of undercover operations.  The 
criticism against the application of undercover operations and traps can be 
summarised as follows: 
• Enticement by informers who are mostly dubious characters. 
• Unacceptable tactics such as deception are used to lure suspects into the 
commissioning of an offence. 
• Fabrication of evidence. 
• Police corruption. 
• Abuse of the judicial process. 
 
Based on the personal experience of the researcher and the literature at hand the 
researcher concurs with Lambrechts (2005:690) that the suspect must be the architect 
to commit crime, whilst the informer and agent must play a passive role to a large 
extent.  Investigators who engage in undercover operations must be cognisant of 
criticism against undercover operations.  These investigators should endeavour to 
counter all possible criticism by implementing proactive measures to ensure that 
undercover operations are set in a fair manner.  This might limit criticism to the 
minimum.  
 
 
2.8 Legal aspects with regards to undercover operations 
 
In order for undercover operations to be applied fairly and to minimise criticism it is 
important for users of undercover operations to be knowledgeable about and 
cognisant of the law that is applicable to the system.  In addition it is equally important 
for detectives to adhere to the internal directives of the South African Police Service in 
order to apply the system correctly. 
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All the advocate and detective participants agree that undercover operations are 
judicially sufficiently regulated.  The detective and advocate participants were 
requested to motivate their answers: 
• All thirty (30) detective and five (5) advocate participants referred to section 
252(A) of the Criminal Procedure Act, Act 51 of 1977.  
• Twenty one (21) detective and four (4) advocate participants referred to juris 
prudence (case law).  
• Nineteen (19) detective participants and all five (5) advocate participants 
referred to the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996. 
• Seven (7) detective participants broadly referred to the Criminal Procedure Act, 
Act 51 of 1977.    
 
Regrettably not one of the participants referred to section 208 (Cautionary rule) of the 
Criminal Procedure Act, Act 51 of 1977.  The above-mentioned aspects and section 
208 of the Criminal Procedure Act, Act 51 of 1977 will be addressed in this part of the 
chapter.     
 
2.8.1 Cautionary rule and corroboration 
 
Kriegler and Kruger (2002:518) indicate that the cautionary rule is to be found in 
section 208 of the Criminal Procedure Act, Act 51 of 1977.  This section stipulates that 
a conviction may follow upon the testimony of a single witness.  The cautionary rule is 
rules that compel magistrates to treat certain witnesses with suspicion. Joubert, 
Struwig and van Veenendaal (2001:398-402) state that the following categories must 
be treated with caution: 
• agents/traps 
• single witnesses 
• accomplices 
• children 
• complainants of sexual crimes 
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When adjudicating the above-mentioned categories testimony the magistrate must 
seek for corroboration to make sure that a wrong verdict is not made.  Kriegler and 
Kruger (2002:518) and Joubert et al. (2001:398-402) concur that corroboration in the 
form of co-agents, observations, interception and monitoring of conversations are 
important to enable the presiding officer to make the correct ruling.  
 
In S v Mabaso 1978 (3) SA 5 (O) it was decided that the evidence of an undercover 
agent must be treated with suspicion as agents pretend to be involved with criminal 
activities, whilst they have a motive to arrest the suspect and secure his or her 
conviction.  Sorgdrager, Coertzen, Bezuidenhout and Nel (1997:279) and Kriegler and 
Kruger (2002:638) concur and refer to the rules laid down by the court in S v Mabaso 
1978 (3) SA 5 (O) to ensure that that the evidence of agents are reliable.  The 
following aspects need to be highlighted: 
• Objects used during the undercover operation must be properly marked. 
Example: Money, unwrought gold. 
• Agents must be searched before and after undercover operations. 
• Agents must be kept under observation during the undercover operation. 
 
Kriegler and Kruger (2002:522) indicate that the testimony of agents needs to be 
honest and in particular reliable.  Welch (2000:8) agrees with the former authors and 
emphasises that courts must ensure that accused receive a fair trial.  Therefore courts 
will carefully scrutinise the evidence relating to undercover operations against the 
cautionary rule. 
 
The thirty (30) detective participants mentioned a myriad of important measures to 
corroborate the evidence gathered during an undercover operation.  The participants 
were requested to indicate how they would ensure that corroborative evidence is 
gathered in terms of section 252(A) of the Criminal Procedure Act, Act 51 of 1977. 
The most prevalent answers are as follows: 
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• Make use of co-agents during the undercover operation. It will counter an 
averment by the defence council that misrepresentations were made to the 
accused. 
• Obtain affidavits of all the role players directly after the transaction. 
• The member/officer in charge of the operation must keep detailed crime scene 
notes of the occurrences. 
• Observation and surveillance duties must be conducted, if possible. 
• Make use of audio/video material if circumstances prevail. 
• Take photos of the transaction. 
• Obtain and verify documentary evidence, for instance gold transaction notes 
and calculations. 
• Search agents before and after transactions. 
• Conduct interception and monitoring in terms of sections 16 to 20 of the 
Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of Communication-
related Information Act, Act 70 of 2002. 
 
When the responses of the participants are compared with the literature it is clear that 
the detectives have a good knowledge basis of how to corroborate evidence gathered 
during an undercover operation.  Section 208 of the Criminal Procedure Act, Act 51 of 
1977, reported judgements and the above-mentioned authors unambiguously alerts 
users of undercover operations and traps to sufficiently corroborate evidence, since 
the evidence of agents or traps will be evaluated and scrutinised with circumspect. 
 
2.8.2 Section 35(5) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996 
 
Section 35(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996 
makes provision that every accused has the right to a fair trail. Section 35(5) of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa stipulates that evidence obtained in a 
manner that violates any right in the Bill of Rights must be ruled inadmissible and 
excluded from the trial if it will render the trial unfair or be detrimental to the 
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administration of justice (South Africa, 1996: sec. 35(3)).  It is commonly referred to as 
the exclusionary rule. 
 
In S v Mkonto 2001 (4) BCLR (CPD) the judge held that our law makes provision for a 
determination if an accused had a fair trial or not by taking into consideration the 
provisions of section 252(A) of the Criminal Procedure Act, Act 51 of 1977.  The 
Judge ruled that our law does not make provision for a defence of entrapment, but 
that the rights of an accused to a fair trial as enshrined in the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa is paramount. 
 
In a recent verdict in S v Mthembu [2008] JOL 21609 (SCA) the Supreme Court of 
Appeal ruled that the conduct of the police was of such a nature that it would 
compromise the integrity of the judicial process and dishonour the administration of 
justice if the evidence is not excluded from the proceedings.  It resulted in the 
exclusion of the inadmissibly obtained evidence in terms of section 35(5) of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996.   
 
In both S v Hayes and Another 1998 (1) SACR 625 (OPD) and S v Nortjé 1996 (2) 
SACR 308 (CPD) the learned judges ruled that the conduct by the agents/informers 
during these undercover operations were fundamentally so unfair that the right to a 
fair trail was violated and their convictions and sentences were set aside.  In both 
instances the court found that the suspects were unfairly enticed and lured into traps 
by the agents/informers (Lambrechts, 2005:711-712).  In Mendes v Kitching 1995 (2) 
SACR 634 (E) the Judge ruled that the specific circumstances of every undercover 
operation should be adjudicated separately, since all undercover operations are not 
unconstitutional.  
 
All the detective and advocate participants were requested to mention what problems 
they encounter with informers during undercover operations. As can be seen from the 
advocate and detective participants responses more than one participant could have 
provided the same answer or more than one answer in the response to the question. 
 42 
The thirty (30) detective participants responded as follows: 
• Nine (9) participants mentioned that a limited number of informers entice 
suspects to commit crime. 
• Seven (7) participants cited excessive drinking as a frequent reason for failure 
in the past. 
• Three (3) participants reported that informers become so anxious to conduct a 
transaction that they abandon all safety rules. 
• Four (4) participants referred to informers that act beyond their mandate. 
• Nine (9) participants mentioned poor reporting abilities, both verbally and 
orally. 
• Eleven (11) participants pointed to sub-standard informer handling that 
contributes to informers acting in an unacceptable manner. 
The five (5) advocate participants reported as follows: 
• Three (3) participants referred to informers that supply information that is not 
factually correct. 
• All five (5) participants mentioned that some informers revert to enticement to 
obtain successes. 
• Two (2) participants referred to informers with ulterior agendas as a matter of 
concern. 
• One (1) participant mentioned that some informers who were used as 
witnesses in the past did not make a good impression to court. 
The remarks by the thirty (30) detective participants and five (5) advocate participants 
in relation to enticement, ulterior motives and acting beyond their mandate are in line 
with the reported judgments that informers are in some instances the reason for a 
successful argument that the constitutional rights of an accused have been infringed. 
This is an area for concern, since it may jeopardise future undercover operations.    
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Based on the literature, interviews and personal experience of the researcher the 
researcher is of the opinion that the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 
108 of 1996 is the supreme law of South Africa and the Law is protecting all the 
citizens of the country. It is therefore imperative for members of the South African 
Police Service, agents and informers to respect the rights of individuals as enshrined 
in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996.    
 
2.8.3 Section 252(A) of the Criminal Procedure Act, Act 51 of 1977 
 
2.8.3.1 Purpose and effect of section 252(A) of the Criminal Procedure Act,   Act 51 of 
1977 
 
According to Brown (2001:125), it is of utmost importance that the prosecutor, 
investigator, informer and agent involved in an investigation have discussions with 
regards to undercover operations.  This will ensure that legal aspects are adhered to, 
if the prosecutor is willing to agree to an undercover operation with the specific 
informer.  
 
The five (5) advocate participants were requested to make suggestions as to how to 
minimise problems with informers during undercover operations. The following are 
their suggestions: 
• Co-operation and communication between the investigator, prosecutor and 
agents are essential to achieve the desired results. 
• Proper and thorough consultation and assessment of the informer is necessary 
to minimise problems during undercover operations.  
 
Van Rooyen (2001:145) purports that the legislature sought to inter alia avoid the 
conviction of innocent people who was unfairly and improperly tricked into the 
offences when adding section 252(A) of the Criminal Procedure Act, Act 51 of 1977. 
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The thirty (30) detective participants summarise the purpose of section 252(A) of the 
Criminal Procedure Act, Act 51of 1977 to be: 
• A control measure to regulate undercover operations and to set limits. The 
agents, informer and handler are bound to these limits and they need to 
execute the operation within these boundaries. 
• It provides guidelines to the parties involved. 
• It authorises an undercover operation. 
• The section indemnifies agents who acted in good faith. 
 
Kriegler and Kruger (2002:637), Lambrechts (2005:685-686), Commission of Inquiry 
(1994:3) and Welch (2000:2) concur that the following aspects serve as the purpose 
for the adding of section 252(A) of the Criminal Procedure Act, Act 51of 1977: 
• Undercover operations to be retained in South Africa as a method to 
investigate and combat crime. 
• Undercover operations are to be subjected to greater judicial control. 
• Entrapment is not created as a defence. 
• The court has the discretion to differentiate between good and bad undercover 
operations. 
• Evidence gathered by means of admissible methods will be accepted. 
• The court has the discretion to exclude evidence improperly obtained if it will 
render the trial unfair or it will be detrimental to the administration of justice. The 
onus rests on the state to prove on a balance of probabilities that the evidence 
is admissible. 
 
From the discussions by the participating detectives and the above-mentioned authors 
it is evident that both groups embrace the view that the purpose of section 252(A) of 
the Criminal Procedure Act, Act 51 of 1977 is to regulate the setting of undercover 
operations. The above-mentioned author’s views are from a judicial perspective, whilst 
the participating detectives view the purpose from an operational perspective. 
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The five (5) advocate and thirty (30) detective participants were requested to 
elaborate on the effect of section 252(A) of the Criminal Procedure Act, Act 51 of 1977 
on the execution of undercover operations.  The remarks of the thirty (30) detective 
participants were summarised as follows: 
• The section promotes transparency by creating an environment in which 
undercover operations are set in a lawful and fair manner and suspects 
participate in the crimes voluntarily.  
• It provides agents and informers with a mandate and guidelines and it prevents 
agents from going beyond the creating of an opportunity to commit an offence.   
• The section demarcates undercover operations and limits enticement. 
• Agents who acted in good faith are indemnified against prosecution.  
 
The five (5) advocate participants remarked as followed: 
• The section ensures a focussed, responsible and better controlled operation. 
• Better evidential material is gathered. 
• It prevents agents from going beyond the creating of an opportunity to commit 
an offence.  
• It has the effect of regulating undercover operations and thereby promoting 
transparency and a fair trial.  
 
From the different perspectives it is eminent that the two samples embrace each other 
on the effect of section 252(A) of the Criminal Procedure Act, Act 51 of 1977 on the 
execution of undercover operations.  It is clear that this section has created an 
environment from where undercover operations are conducted in a transparent, 
focussed, controlled and fair manner.  Section 252(A) of the Criminal Procedure Act, 
Act 51 of 1977 established a platform where agents and investigators need to conduct 
undercover operations within the boundaries set by the Director of Public 
Prosecutions and the framework of the section.    
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2.8.3.2 Discussion of section 252(A) of the Criminal Procedure Act, Act 51 of 1977. 
  
Section 252(A) of the Criminal Procedure Act, Act 51 of 1977 consists of seven sub-
sections.  Clarke et al. (2004:338-340) indicate that sub-section (1) of section 252(A) 
of the Criminal Procedure Act, Act 51 of 1977 stipulates that any law enforcement 
officer, official of the state or any other person authorised for such purpose may 
engage in an undercover operation to: detect, investigate, prevent or uncover the 
commission of an offence. 
 
Kriegler and Kruger (2002:637) are of the opinion that it is not clear what is meant by 
law enforcement officer and official of the state as none are defined in the act.  The 
author suspects that it refers to policemen and peace officers.  Lambrechts (2005:688) 
however explains that the terms refer to policemen, traffic officers, Correctional 
Service employees, National Intelligence Agency personnel and South African Secret 
Service members.  
 
Sub-section (1) of section 252(A) of the Criminal Procedure Act, Act 51 of 1977 further 
entails that evidence obtained shall be admissible and admitted as evidence, if the 
conduct does not go beyond the creating of an opportunity to commit crime. 
Lambrechts (2005:690) and Welch (2000:2) agree that it means that the agent(s) are 
not permitted to incite, instigate, command or procure the accused into committing the 
offence.  These authors are further of the opinion that if the agent played an active 
role in persuading the accused to commit the offence, a ruling that their conduct went 
beyond the creating of an opportunity to commit an offence is inevitable.  Kriegler and 
Kruger (2002:639) add that it will not go beyond the creating of an opportunity to 
commit an offence if the temptation is not bigger than it normally appears in our 
community.  
 
Sub-section (2) of section 252(A) of the Criminal Procedure Act, Act 51 of 1977 makes 
provision for the factors that need to be considered when the court rules on whether 
the conduct has gone beyond the providing of an opportunity to commit an offence.  
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The legislature deemed it fit to include fourteen factors that need to be considered.  
Lambrechts (2008:71) proposes that investigators need to properly prepare 
themselves to answer on all fourteen aspects, since defence council might cross-
examine a state witness on the fourteen factors.  In S v Hammond 2008 (1) SACR 
476 (SCA) the Supreme Court of Appeal ruled that there is no requirement that all 
fourteen factors need to be considered by the trial court.  
 
In a recent verdict in S v Van der Berg and Another 2008 (2) SACR 319 (CPD) the 
judge ruled that the conduct of the police went beyond creating an opportunity to 
commit an offence, as they failed to prove on a balance of probabilities, that sub-
section 2(a)(b)(c)(d)(e) and (f) of section 252(A) of the Criminal Procedure Act, Act 51 
of 1977 were adhered to.  This resulted in the exclusion of the evidence obtained by 
means of the trap.  Subsequently the convictions and sentences were set aside.  
Kriegler and Kruger (2002:638) discuss the fourteen factors that investigators need to 
prepare themselves for as follows:  
 
(a) Whether, prior to the setting of the trap or the use of an undercover operation, 
approval, if it was required, was obtained from the Director of Public 
Prosecutions (Attorney-general) to engage in such investigation methods and 
the extent to which the instructions or guidelines issued by the attorney-general 
were adhered to. 
 
Welch (2000:2) decided that prior written approval shall be obtained from the 
relevant Director of Public Prosecutions before an undercover operation is 
undertaken. The author indicates that prior approval is not needed in 
circumstances where it is the objective to immediately arrest the accused for the 
committed crimes. Lambrechts (2005:694) indicates that court also have to 
consider if the instructions issued by the Director of Public Prosecutions have been 
adhered to. That is if specific guidelines or instructions were issued.  
 
(b) The nature of the offence under investigation, including- 
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(i) Whether the security of the State, the safety of the public, the 
maintenance of public order or the national economy is seriously 
threatened thereby. 
(ii) The prevalence of the offence in the area concerned. 
(iii) The seriousness of such offence. 
 
Lambrechts (2005:694) indicates that specifically with regard to gold cases, it is 
important for investigators to have the necessary evidence to their disposal to 
prove that the occurrence of the theft of and dealing in gold threatens the national 
economy of South Africa.  Based on the experience of the researcher in cases of 
this nature the researcher is of the opinion that investigators can also prove that 
the illegal smuggling of gold is a serious offence by indicating to court that it is 
listed as schedule 1 offences in the Prevention of Organised Crime Act, Act 121 of 
1998.  Coetzee and Horn (2006:35-37) illustrate by means of statistics the 
magnitude of the threat.  Statistics on the prevalence of the crimes for the period 
January 2000 to June 2003 is reflected in tables 2-1 and 2-2.   
  
          Year       Mass in kg.        Cases         Arrests 
         2000      25,560.9           2164          1549 
         2001      43,127.9           1441          1497 
         2002    544,987.3           1806          1332 
         2003      19,578.5           1201            867 
         Total    633,254.6 kg.           6612          5245 
 
Table 2-1: Police statistics of recovered precious metals from January 2000 to June 
2003 (Coetzee & Horn, 2006:37) 
 
Branch 2000 2001 2002 2003 Total 
Klerksdorp 240 232 198 321 991 
Barberton 118 84 119 61 382 
Polokwane 26 20 9 23 78 
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West Rand 519 595 342 131 1587 
East Rand 134 57 105 47 343 
Rustenburg 0 0 0 0 0 
Lichtenburg 4 0 26 0 30 
Johannesburg 27 5 26 42 100 
Welkom  481 504 507 242 1734 
Total 1549 1497 1332 867 5245 
 
Table 2-2: Amount of cases per unit for the period January 2000 to June 2003 
(Coetzee & Horn, 2006:37) 
 
(c) The availability of other techniques for the detection, investigation or 
uncovering of the commission of the offence or the prevention thereof in the 
particular circumstances of the case and of the accused.  
 
The question that arises is how effective other techniques will be to gather the 
required evidence to prove the case. The question posed to all the detective and 
advocate participants was, are undercover operations an effective method to 
investigate precious metals related crimes? The question and detailed responses 
are to be found under paragraph 2.6.2 of this chapter.  
 
The core of the participant’s argument is that undercover operations are especially 
effective, because these crimes are committed in secrecy and it offers an 
opportunity to law enforcement officers to gather evidence against role players 
within the syndicate.  Conventional methods will not suffice to effectively address 
these crimes.    
 
(d) Whether an average person who was in the position of the accused would have 
been induced into the commission of an offence by the kind of conduct 
employed by the official or his or her agent concerned. 
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According to Lambrechts (2005:696), it is not clear what the legislature meant 
when this factor was included into the act. 
 
(e) The degree of persistence and number of attempts made by the official or his or 
her agent before the accused succumbed and committed the offence. 
 
According to circular 43/2/1 of 2004 of the South African Police Service (par.16.2), 
every meeting or contact between the agent/informer and suspect must be noted 
and included into the statement of the witness. The contents of the discussions 
and who made the contact must also be embodied in the statement. Based on the 
experience of the researcher it is advised that investigators should obtain detailed 
telephone data to indicate how many times contact was established and by whom.     
 
(f) The type of inducement used, including the degree of deceit, trickery, 
misrepresentation or reward.  
 
Frazier (1994:143) indicates that an agent should never suggest a crime or take 
part in a crime.  The suspects must do the thinking, planning and talking to commit 
crime.  This will ensure that the perpetrators cannot claim that they were induced 
by the agent to commit crime.  Circular 43/2/1 of 2004 of the South African Police 
Service (Par. 14.1 & 16.1), point out that an investigator must ascertain whether 
enticement, procurement or instigation was employed by the informer or agent to 
infiltrate the suspect.  This circular further directs that the agent who contacts the 
suspect must investigate the possibility that the suspect was enticed by the 
informer into the commission of an offence. 
 
In S v Spies and Another 2000 (1) SACR 312 (SCA) the learned Judge found that 
it cannot be found that the accused had been induced to purchase diamonds at a 
reduced price, because the diamonds had initially been offered at their true value. 
The accused bargained down the price.  The accused even brought along their 
own equipment to weigh the diamonds when they met the agent. 
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(g) The timing of the conduct, in particular whether the official or his or her agent 
instigated the commission of the offence or became involved in an existing 
unlawful activity.  
 
Circular 43/2/1 of 2004 of the South African Police Service (Par. 15.2) instructs that 
investigators need to verify whether the suspect are already involved with illegal 
activities.  It is the experience of the researcher that investigators need to seek for 
corroboration that a suspect has an existing illegal enterprise, before engaging into 
an undercover operation.  For instance: An informer reports that A is purchasing 
crude gold from thieves and he refines the gold at the back of his house.  Confirm 
or refute the allegation by means of observation duties. 
 
(h) Whether the conduct involved an exploitation of human characteristics such as 
emotions, sympathy or friendship or an exploitation of the accused personal, 
professional or economic circumstances in order to increase the probability of 
the commission of the offence. 
 
Lambrechts (2005:697) advises that if investigators establish that any of the 
above-mentioned circumstances are present to rather cancel the undercover 
operation until the specific circumstances subside.  As a result of the researcher’s 
experience of undercover operations the researcher proposes that suspects who 
are in dire financial difficulty should not be considered to be targeted in an 
undercover operation.  Alternative options should be considered.  Rather warn the 
suspect that the South African Police Service is aware of his/her planned illegal 
activities and that he/she should refrain from continuing with this action. The 
argument is based on the belief that this conduct will strengthen the purpose of 
undercover operations to only use the method against individuals and syndicates 
who are actively involved in the commissioning of the offences.    
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(i) Whether the official or his or her agent has exploited a particular vulnerability of 
the accused such as a mental handicap or a substance addiction.  
 
Based on the researchers experience it is important to be aware of possible 
vulnerabilities of the suspect before engaging into an undercover operation against 
the suspect, as it may jeopardise the prosecution of the suspect. 
 
(j) The proportionality between the involvement of the official or his or her agent 
as compared to that of the accused, including an assessment of the extent of 
the harm caused or risked by the official or his or her agent as compared to that 
of the accused, and the commission of any illegal acts by the official or his or 
her agent. 
  
Lambrechts (2005:698) is of the view that there must be a balance between the 
conduct of the agent and that of the accused. 
  
(k) Any threats, implied or expressed, by the official or his or her agent against the 
accused. 
 
Based on the experience of the researcher it is advisable to let the suspect make 
voluntary decisions during an undercover operation and not to apply pressure onto 
the suspect at any stage before, during or after the undercover operation.  
 
(l) Whether, before the trap was set or the undercover operation was used, there 
existed any suspicion, entertained upon reasonable grounds, that the accused 
had committed an offence similar to that to which the charge relates.  
 
In S v Mkonto 2001 (4) BCLR (CPD) the judge found that the suspicion of the 
police did not justify reasonable grounds that the accused had committed a similar 
offence previously.  The conviction and sentence was set aside.  Lambrechts 
(2005:699) advises that the state should revert to Shabalala and Others v 
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Attorney-General of Transvaal and Another 1995 (2) SACR 761 (CC) when section 
252(A)(2)(l) of the Criminal Procedure Act, Act 51 of 1977 are under attack by the 
defence.  The case stated that the identity of an informer may be protected against 
disclosure, if there is a reasonable risk that such disclosure might lead to the 
intimidation of witnesses or otherwise prejudice the proper ends of justice.  Based 
on the discussion above it is the contention of the researcher that investigators 
must be cautious to ensure that reasonable grounds based on a suspicion existed 
before they embark on undercover operations. 
 
(m) Whether the official or his or her agent acted in good or bad faith. 
 
Lambrechts (2005:701) has remarked that officials need to act “reasonable” to be 
categorised as acting in good faith or bona fide. 
 
(n) Any other factor which in the opinion of the court has a bearing on the question.  
 
Sub-section 3(a) of section 252(A) of the Criminal Procedure Act, Act 51 of 1977 
indicates that a court may refuse to allow evidence if the setting of the undercover 
operation has gone further than the creating of an opportunity to commit an offence. 
Sub-section 3(b) of section 252(A) of the Criminal Procedure Act, Act 51 of 1977 
indicates that the court shall weigh the public interest against the personal interest of 
the accused when adjudicating the matter. Factors that need consideration are 
referred to under sub-section 3(b)(i)(ii). 
 
Sub-section (4) of section 252(A) of the Criminal Procedure Act, Act 51 of 1977 rules 
that, any Director of Public Prosecutions may issue general and or specific guidelines 
to co-ordinate undercover operations in his area of jurisdiction.  In S v David and 
Another 2008 (1) SACR 205 (WLD) the judge remarked that the South African Police 
Service members involved with the case did not obtain nor sought the authority of the 
Director of Public Prosecutions.  Based on the experience of the researcher he is of 
the opinion that although it is not a pre-requisite to obtain authority it is advisable to 
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seek the authority and guidance of the Director of Public Prosecutions before 
engaging into an undercover operation.    
 
Sub-section (5) of section 252(A) of the Criminal Procedure Act, Act 51 of 1977 directs 
that an agent who acted in good faith is not criminally liable.  In S v Ohlenschläger 
1992 (1) SACR 695 (T) the learned judge remarked that an agent is not liable for 
prosecution, since the absence of mens rea.  The agent has no choice other than to 
co-operate and to take part in the offences to create an opportunity for the accused to 
commit an offence.  
 
Buckwalter (1983:144) indicates that agents may be invited by syndicate members to 
take part in criminal activities by the syndicate.  The researcher is of the opinion, 
based on his personal experience, that the agent will act in good faith by obtaining the 
necessary authority from the Director of Public Prosecutions to continue with the 
criminal activities if the agent is not already indemnified against the specific offences.  
It is important to mention that no Director of Public Prosecutions will grant authority to 
agents to commit murder or offences that may lead to the death or injury of any 
individual.  It is recommended that agents refrain from this conduct or withdraw from a 
situation under these circumstances. 
  
Sub-section (6) of section 252(A) of the Criminal Procedure Act, Act 51 of 1977 
stipulates that the onus rests on the state to prove on a balance of probabilities that 
the evidence is admissible, provided that the defence indicates on what grounds the 
evidence is challenged.  
 
Sub-section (7) of section 252(A) of the Criminal Procedure Act, Act 51 of 1977 
provides that the adjudication of evidence may be heard as a trial within a trial.  It is 
the experience of the researcher that some magistrates prefer to hear all the evidence 
before court, before making a ruling on the admissibility of the evidence, whilst others 
treat the matter as a trial within a trial.  
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2.8.4 South African Police Service directives 
 
According to Clarke et al. (2004:342), the South African Police Service has no specific 
guidelines in effect pertaining to undercover operations.  The researcher agrees with 
the authors.  The researcher sought specific South African Police Service directives 
with regards to undercover operations, but could not find any. The only guidance with 
regards to undercover operations was found in the following documents: 
• Circular 43/2/1 of 2004 of the South African Police Service guides the 
investigation of precious metals and diamond investigations and undercover 
operations with regards to these commodities. 
• Circular 26/88/2 of 2004 of the South African Police Service is the policy 
document for the Organised Crime Component.  This document depicts that 
undercover operations will be regulated in terms of Section 252(A) of the 
Criminal Procedure Act, Act 51 of 1977.  No discussion could be found on how 
to conduct an undercover operation. 
 
The five (5) advocate participants share the view that in some instances the 
application of undercover operations is not sufficiently regulated within SAPS.  
Information sharing and communication are lacking. This leads to agents arresting 
each other during undercover operations.  It is the experience of the researcher that it 
frequently happens that agents arrest one another due to a lack of communication, co-
ordination and trust amongst the respective units.  
 
Five (5) of the detective participants stated that undercover operations are not 
sufficiently regulated within the South African Police Service.  These participants 
reported that secrecy is lacking during the approval and management of the operation.  
Too many people are involved in the process.  The remaining twenty five (25) 
participants are of the opinion that undercover operations are sufficiently regulated in 
the South African Police Service.  The participants argue that officers and project 
managers conduct regular inspections and they closely monitor progress and 
developments within the investigation. 
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To obtain an objective picture of the different views it is important to analyse the 
perspectives by the participants.  The advocate participants and five detective 
participants are of the opinion that undercover operations are not sufficiently 
regulated.  Twenty five (25) detective participants share the view that undercover 
operations are sufficiently regulated.  The views of the participants are a reflection of 
their own personal experience and knowledge on the aspect. 
 
From the perspective of the advocates it is apparent that a lack of communication and 
co-ordination of undercover operations are detrimental to obtain the desired results. 
Five (5) of the detective participants are of the opinion that secrecy is compromised 
during the registration process, while the rest of the detective participants honour the 
opinion that undercover operations are sufficiently regulated on an operational level. 
 
The views from the participants clearly indicate that a dispute exists between the 
participants.  From their perspectives it is clear that problems exist specifically with 
regards to co-ordination, communication and secrecy of undercover operations.  This 
is indicative of the fact that no specific directives are governing undercover operations 
in SAPS, as purported by Clarke et al. (2004:342).  The perspective by the majority of 
participants can not be rejected, since it is their experience that undercover operations 
are sufficiently controlled on an operational level.   
 
 
2.9 Phases of undercover operations 
 
Knipe et al. (2002:25) indicate that organisations that perform projects divide the 
project into phases to provide control and effective management over the ongoing 
operation.  According to Knipe et al. (2002:27) and van der Waldt and du Toit 
(1999:321), every project consists of at least the four basic phases namely: 
• initiation 
• planning  
 57 
• execution  
• control and project closing 
 
Only the sample of detectives was tested on their knowledge of undercover operation 
phases.  The thirty (30) detective participants argued that the following phases are 
necessary to effectively conclude a precious metals undercover operation:  
• intelligence gathering 
• planning: 
o objectives 
o investigative strategy 
o role players 
o legal aspects 
o finance & logistics 
• obtain mandate 
• execution and evaluation 
• termination phase: 
o arrest of syndicate members 
o seizure of exhibits: Precious metals, cash, documentary evidence, 
electronic evidence, gold processing equipment etc. 
o seizure of assets 
• litigation phase 
 
The argument by the participants is corroborated by the South African Police Service 
(c2000:5-6) that indicates that undercover operations in the South African Police 
Service are based on project management principles.  The project process consists of 
three phases namely: 
• plan and propose a project 
• implement and control the project 
• close the project 
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The researcher agrees with the literature and participants, since it is a logic and 
comprehensive manner to go about the execution of a precious metals undercover 
operation. The experience and training of the researcher directs that it is important for 
undercover operations to be properly managed by means of project management 
principles to ensure that the set objectives are obtained.  
 
 
2.10 Summary:     
 
From the above exposition it is obvious that undercover operations are an 
internationally accepted method to address organised crime.  Hence it is a forensic 
method to investigate crime, since the method is based on scientific knowledge.  
Although criticism has accumulated over the use of the system over many decades it 
remains an effective tool to successfully gather evidence against crime syndicates.  
 
It is imperative for investigators to adhere to the applicable law, directives and Director 
of Public Prosecutions instructions to ensure that undercover operations are 
concluded in a fair and transparent manner.  Without the use of informers it will be 
virtually impossible to engage into an undercover operation, since the police will have 
no intelligence to engage into an investigation of this nature.  The following chapter 
will focus on the use of informers during undercover operations. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
THE USE OF INFORMERS DURING UNDERCOVER POLICE OPERATIONS 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The use of informers originated from the Bible, where Judas sent out spies to trap 
Jesus (Madinger, 2000:19-20 & Lambrechts, 2005:679).  Van der Westhuizen 
(1996:101) and Madinger (2000:20) concur that the primary duty of informers is to 
convey information about crime.  The use of informers involves the community in the 
prevention and combating of crime.   
 
Informers are and will remain an integral part to effectively combat crime around the 
globe.  Billingsley, Nemitz and Bean (2001:5) claim that about one third of all crimes 
are cleared up as a result of informer information.  Schmalleger (2005:300) indicates 
that the use of informers forms part of a complex information gathering process.  This 
information gathering technique is an area of concern to ethics, since the police often 
pay individuals for information.  
 
According to Marais and Van Rooyen (1990:131), the use of informers will continue to 
exist as a method to gather information, although the police have entered a 
technological advanced era.  Carlen and Morgan (1999:57) add that informers are 
important instruments to gather information and evidence on serious crime networks in 
this era of rapidly growing trans-national organised crime. 
   
This chapter will address the following important aspects regarding the use of 
informers.  It will shed light on the meaning of an informer and an agent, informer 
privilege and justification for using informers will be discussed.  The chapter will 
continue to address different types of informers and their motives for relating 
information.  The focus will also be on the role of informers during precious metals 
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undercover operations and important aspects that need consideration when informers 
are used during precious metals undercover operations. 
 
 
3.2 The different roles of the informer and agent 
 
In order to understand the differences between an informer and agent it is necessary 
to take cognizance of their different meanings.  In R v Van Schalkwyk 1938 AD 543 
the Judge ruled that an informer is a person that gives information that is prejudicial to 
others.  The information must be of a criminal nature which leads to a criminal 
prosecution.  Broodryk et al. (2001:337) and Lambrechts (2005:648) indicate that an 
informer is a person who supplies information to the police about crime or the planned 
commission of a crime that is prejudicial to others and it may be the cause of a 
criminal prosecution. 
 
According to Marais and Van Rooyen (1990:133), any person is a potential informer.  
The authors are of the opinion that it is difficult to connect a specific definition to the 
term informer, since the circumstances of informers vary.  It is the experience of the 
researcher that informers do not operate within a rigid environment.  Informers may be 
utilised for different roles within the crime-fighting domain. 
   
Welch (2000:1) as well as Marais and Van Rooyen (1990:149) argue that an agent is 
a person who with a view of securing the conviction of another proposes certain 
criminal conduct to the individual and he or she takes part in the operation thereof.  
 
Based on the researcher’s experience it is important to be aware that agents are not 
necessarily always members of the police.  Kriegler and Kruger (2002:638) indicate 
that when an informer is used as an agent during an undercover operation the 
informer is no longer regarded as an informer, but as an agent.  The person is then a 
compellable witness who is subjected to cross examination by the defence during a 
trial.  Lambrechts (2005:648) concurs with Kriegler and Kruger (2002:638) by stating 
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that an informer required to act as an agent is not entitled to the informer privilege as it 
is not in the public interest to protect him by means of section 202 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act, Act 51 of 1977.  
 
All thirty (30) detective participants were requested to comment on the effect of the 
informer privilege when an informer is used as an agent during an undercover 
operation.  All of them acknowledged that the informer is no more protected by the 
privilege, if he or she were used as an agent. However, eight (8) participants indicated 
that the disclosure of the agent to the broad public may be limited, by applying to the 
trial court to lead the evidence of the agent in camera.  This is indicative of their 
knowledge and experience on how to protect an informer who had been used as an 
agent.  Kriegler and Kruger (2002:338) direct that section 153(2) of the Criminal 
Procedure Act, Act 51 of 1977 makes provision for an informer and or agent to testify 
in camera.  Section 153(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act, Act 51 of 1977 grants a 
magistrate the discretion to allow a witness to testify under circumstances where the 
witness is protected against the broad community or specific persons, when there is a 
possibility that the person’s safety or that of his/her family are at risk.  
 
In S v Makhanya 2002 (3) SA 201 (NPD) the court ruled that when the conduct of the 
informer is of such a nature that he or she formed part of the operation the person is 
regarded as an agent and the provisions of section 252(A) of the Criminal Procedure 
Act, Act 51 of 1977 is applicable to the person.  
 
From the research it is eminent that differences exist between the terms informer and 
agent.  An informer provides information about a criminal nature that is prejudicial to 
another person, whilst an agent conducts criminal activities with a suspect, whilst 
having a motive to secure a conviction against the person.  An informer may be used 
as an agent on condition that the informer is then regarded a compellable witness who 
is bound by the stipulations of section 252(A) of the Criminal Procedure Act, Act 51 of 
1977.  Based on the research and the experience of the researcher it is the contention 
of the researcher that an informer is predominantly busy with the gathering of 
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information and intelligence, whilst an agent ostensibly takes part in criminal conduct 
and thereby gathers evidence against the identified suspects for purposes of litigation.   
 
  
3.3 Informer privilege 
 
Kriegler and Kruger (2002:503-505) and Lambrechts (2005:648-649) agree that the 
informer privilege is necessitated to protect informers from the revenge of criminals. 
Holtz (2005:384) corroborates their version by stating that the purpose of the privilege 
is the furtherance and protection of the public interest in effective law enforcement. 
According to Marais and Van Rooyen (1990:144-145) and Schmidt and Rademeyer 
(2000:583), it is important to protect the identity of informers to encourage information 
by the community.  If their identity is not protected the community at large will be 
reluctant to convey information out of fear for revenge.  Schmidt and Rademeyer 
(2000:583) indicate that not only the identity of the informer is protected but also the 
contents of the communication. 
   
According to Broodryk et al. (2001:362), it is important to enforce the privilege not only 
to protect the informer but also to protect the community at large.  Furthermore it is the 
obligation of the state to encourage citizens to convey information about crime 
(Broodryk et al., 2001:362).  Marais and Van Rooyen (1990:145) mention that the 
state has the obligation to enforce and protect the substantive right of an informer to 
the privilege. In Swanepoel v Minister of Safety and Security 1999 (2) SASV 284 (T) 
the Judge ruled that the privilege belongs to both the state and the informer, since it is 
in the public interest to protect the privilege.  
 
Schmidt and Rademeyer (2000:585) confirm that the court has the final authority to 
decide about the abdication of the privilege. The state does not have the discretion to 
disclose the identity of the informer. The question arises if the informer has the 
discretion to abdicate of the privilege.  Schmidt and Rademeyer (2000:585) indicate 
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that there is no prohibition that forbids the informer to reveal his/her identity and the 
contents of the communication with the police. 
 
In Sulliman v Hansa (2) 1971 4SA 69 (D) the Judge ruled that the informer privilege 
may be relied upon under the following circumstances: 
• The reporting of the information must be made with the belief that the 
information will not be disclosed. 
• The element of confidentiality must be essential to maintain the relationship 
between the parties. It is the intention of the state to protect their sources in an 
endeavour to combat crime. 
• The relationship must be diligently promoted to encourage community 
involvement.  
• The damage to the relationship by disclosing the identity of the informer must 
be bigger as the advantage of making public the identity of the informer.   
 
In R v Van Schalkwyk 1938 AD 543 the Judge ruled that amongst the above-
mentioned aspects it is required that the information must initiate criminal prosecution 
and the information must be given to officers of justice.  In Shabalala v The Attorney-
General of Transvaal and Another 1995 (2) SACR 761 (CC) the court recognised the 
right of the state to rely on the informer privilege.  In Els v Minister of Safety and 
Security 1998 (2) SACR 93 (NCD) the Judge ruled that the informer privilege is one of 
the cornerstones in the fight against organised crime.  The revealing of the identity of 
an informer would have far-reaching implications as it could deter would-be informers 
to give information.  The Judge held that the new Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, Act 108 of 1996 does not have the effect of watering down the effect of the 
informer privilege.  
 
Kriegler and Kruger (2002:503-505) indicates that the informer privilege is to be found 
in section 202 of the Criminal Procedure Act, Act 51 of 1997.  The section deals with 
the privilege against the public making of information on grounds of public policy and 
public interest.  It is important to notice that the privilege is not absolute, but there are 
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exclusions to the rule.  Kriegler and Kruger (2002:503-505) concur with Broodryk et al. 
(2001:363) when indicating that the court restricted informer privilege to instances 
where public policy requires that the identity of the informer be kept secret.  Madinger 
(2000:220) purports that the informer privilege must be balanced against the 
defendant’s rights during criminal proceedings.  Broodryk et al. (2001:363) are of the 
belief that the court has the discretion to reject the claim to informer privilege even if 
all the requirements have been met under circumstances where it is in the interest of 
justice to disclose the identity of the informer.  
 
The exception to the rule is discussed comprehensively in Ex parte Minister of Justice: 
In re R v Pillay 1945 AD 653, the impact of the ruling can be summarised as follows: 
• When it is in the interest of justice to reveal the identity of the informer. 
• If the disclosure can contribute towards the acquittal of the accused. 
• When the identity of the informer is known to the accused. 
 
Steward, Murphy, Pilkington, Penney and Stribopoulus (2006:807) indicate that there 
exist exclusions to the informer privilege.  These authors are of the opinion that the 
exclusions to reveal the identity are warranted under the following circumstances: 
• When the informer has acted as an agent. 
• When the informer is a material witness to the case. 
 
All the detective participants were requested to give their views on the exceptions to 
the privilege.  All thirty (30) detective participants acknowledged that exceptions to the 
rule exist. Their views can be summarised as follows: 
• Seventeen (17) participants reflected that the privilege may not be relied upon 
when the identity of the informer is known to the accused, or when the informer 
acted as an agent during the operation. 
• Five (5) participants referred to malicious actions by the informer that may 
contribute to the acquittal of the suspect. 
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• Eight (8) participants mentioned that the court may order that the informer 
must testify under circumstances where the informer became so involved with 
the criminal activities that it will be in the interest of justice for him/her to testify.     
 
Schmalleger (2005:301) indicates that in the United States of America it is practice 
that the identity of the informer may only be kept secret if the source has been 
explicitly assured of confidentiality.  Brown (2001:128) and Holtz (2005:385) concur 
that the disclosure of the identity of an informer is warranted when the testimony of the 
informer is material to the state or the defence.  All informers are not presumably 
confidential sources.  This is contrary to the position in South Africa, where informers 
are privileged sources except for circumstances as discussed in Ex parte Minister of 
Justice: In re R v Pillay 1945 AD 653. 
 
All thirty (30) detective participants concurred that the informer privilege is protecting 
the identity of the informer. However, only seven (7) participants mentioned that the 
information is also protected by the privilege.  The rest of the sample only referred to 
the protection of the identity aspect.  This may cause problems during testimony at 
court, since unwary detectives may disclose privileged information.  
 
The informer privilege is not an absolute privilege, without exclusions. It is therefore 
not possible to protect the identity and information tendered by the informer under all 
circumstances.  Based on the research and the experience of the researcher it is the 
belief of the researcher that thought needs to be given to the stipulations relating to 
the informer privilege when deciding on an investigative strategy to follow-up 
information tendered by an informer.  If the set requirements are not met, the identity 
of the informer might be disclosed.  This will adversely affect the continuous utilisation 
of the informer as the informer will be exposed to the public and specifically to people 
involved in criminal activities. 
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3.4 Justification for using informers 
 
The researcher is convinced that the use of informers is necessary to create a safe 
environment for all citizens of South Africa.  The method of gathering information by 
means of informers is utilised universally.  Billingsley et al. (2001:55) direct that the 
use of informers derives its strength from the following sources: 
• Police have a general pursuit for intelligence as part of a move to proactive 
policing. 
• From informers’ long history in social control and law enforcement. 
 
According to Billingsley et al. (2001:56), the use of proactive methods such as 
informers and undercover operations rely on deceiving the target and therefore the 
system needs to be properly managed to ensure justification.  According to Marais 
and Van Rooyen (1990:131-132), the use of informers is justified, because the 
community at large expects the authorities to maintain public order.  Reichel 
(2005:376) mentions that the use of informers stretches back some 600 years, when 
the Japanese linked citizens and the police together to maintain social order.  
 
Clarke et al. (2004:308), Madinger (2000:26) and Marais and Van Rooyen (1990: 131-
132) support the view that the use of informers is necessitated by the following 
arguments: 
• Informers may present information about crime that has been committed or 
that is planned. 
• Several crimes are committed in secrecy where there are no eyewitnesses or 
victims.  Without the involvement of informers these crimes would hardly ever 
be brought to book. 
• Informers can identify suspects and they can assist to profile individuals and 
crime syndicates.   
 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996, under section 205 
placed an obligation on the South African Police Service to maintain law and order by 
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means of pro and reactive policing (South Africa, 1996: sec. 205).  According to 
Coetzee and Horn (2006:110), the nature of precious metals theft requires a 
combination of effective informer networks and undercover work to combat these 
crimes effectively.  
 
All thirty (30) detective participants are at heart that although informers have different 
motives for relaying information they are invaluable sources to the police.  The 
participants argue that the following reasons are justification to specifically make use 
of informers during undercover operations and to address crime in general: 
• They may assist in the recovery of stolen property. 
• Gathering of information and intelligence. 
• Infiltration of a syndicate. 
• Introduction of agents to syndicate role players. 
• Identification of suspects and syndicate members involved in serious organised 
crime. 
 
Since the researcher is a member of the National Investigation Task Team he has 
access to the unpublished statistics of the task team.  The statistics are kept by the 
task team.  An analysis of the precious metals statistics revealed that 86% of the 
successes obtained during the period 1 February 2002 to 15 May 2008 can be 
accrued to the information supplied by informers.    
 
Naudé (1999:146) and Madinger (2000:205) stipulate that informers are necessitated, 
because of their criminal background and association with criminals.  Informers’ 
knowledge can therefore be used to the benefit of the police to implement strategies 
to reduce crime or to apprehend criminals.   
 
An analysis of the participants’ views, different authors and statistics clearly indicate 
that informers are necessitated due to their knowledge of and involvement with both 
general crime and crimes that are committed in secrecy and are syndicate related. 
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3.5 Types of informers 
 
Interpretations by Clarke et al. (2004:314), Madinger (2000:27-30), Marais and Van 
Rooyen (1990:134-136) and South African Police Service (c2004:2-3) were compared 
with one another and the results indicate that the following categories are the most 
prevalent types of informers: 
• Fulltime informer: This type of informer is utilised on a continuous and almost 
permanent basis.  These persons receive payment on a monthly basis and are 
experienced and skilled individuals who are deployed to infiltrate crime 
syndicates.  These persons can be utilised for prolonged periods of time, if the 
cover story of the person is not compromised during the undercover operation.  
The difficulty with these informers is vested there in that crime syndicates may 
expect of these people to commit serious crimes to become part of the 
syndicate.  
• Public informers/Occasional informers.  These categories of informers convey 
information when it comes to their attention.  They may be criminals or law 
obedient citizens, but do not give information on a permanent basis.  It is the 
experience of the researcher that these persons are potential fulltime 
informers.  It is therefore important to treat these people fairly by remunerating 
them for valuable information and by training them properly.  
• Paid informers. Financial gain is the exclusive aim before relaying information 
to the authorities.  These individuals usually have close links with the 
underworld and decide which side will be to their benefit, before information is 
transferred to the police.  They might commit crimes to their own benefit, under 
the auspices of a criminal investigation and thereby playing a double role.  It is 
the experience of the researcher that this type of informer is especially 
valuable when dealing with organised crime, such as, for instance the illegal 
dealing in precious metals. These informers have inside knowledge about 
syndicate activities, modus operandi and planned criminal conduct.  
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The thirty (30) detective participants were requested to elaborate on which type of 
informers are predominantly active within the precious metals domain.  Seventeen 
(17) of the participants referred to full time informers, whilst the remaining thirteen (13) 
participants were of the opinion that paid informers are especially active within the 
precious metals domain.  This is indicative of their own operational experience with 
regard to the type of informers relaying information on precious metals related 
offences.  It is the experience of the researcher that fulltime and paid informers are 
paramount to precious metals related investigations.   
 
Based on the research and experience of the researcher it is the contention of the 
researcher that it is expected from detectives engaged in precious metals undercover 
operations to correctly identify the type of informer with whom they are dealing.  The 
correct determination will determine and influence how the informer is used.   
 
 
3.6  Motives of informers 
 
In order for investigators to correctly approach, deal with and deploy informers it is 
necessary to be knowledgeable about their possible motives for conveying 
information.  Madinger (2000:27) indicates that it is important for investigators to know 
where the informer fits in and to have the necessary control over the informer to be 
successful with the investigation at hand.  Brown (2001:127) is of the opinion that 
before an informer’s information can be utilised it must be established if the 
individual’s information is credible and reliable.  Reliability can be demonstrated by 
looking at the “track record” of the informer.  
 
Brown (2001:124), Clarke et al. (2004:315-316) and Marais and Van Rooyen 
(1990:137) agree that the following are the most prominent motives of informers: 
• Financial gain.  Individuals make a living out of conveying information. 
Lambrechts (2005:679) honours the opinion that all informers want to be 
rewarded and they do not give information for free.  Lambrechts (2005:679) 
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corroborates Brown’s (2001:146) version by adding that these types of 
informers are difficult to manage and when the money dries up so does the 
information.  
• Collective responsibility.  An individual gives information as he/she regards it 
his/her responsibility as a law obedient citizen to assist the police to maintain 
public order.  
• Idealistic motives.  Religion, political affiliation and personal interest play a 
pivotal role under this section.  Example: X and Y compete for the same post. X 
is aware of criminal behaviour conducted by Y a long time ago.  X conveys the 
information to the police to eliminate Y as an opponent for the post. 
• Elimination of rival groups.  The sole aim of these informers is to gain control 
over a geographical area and to obtain the monopoly over the commodity.  It is 
the experience of the researcher that this category of informers is valuable 
sources, since their information is accurate and it often leads to arrests or 
seizures.  It is important for investigators to deal with these people 
circumspectly, because it is their secondary goal to be protected from 
prosecution or operations by the police.  
• The following are also listed as possible motives of informers:  Revenge, 
repentance, avoidance of prosecution, emotional needs such as jealousy and 
hatred. In the Bari/Cherney civil rights suit in the United States of America, 
John C Ryan stated that many subjects of prosecution would turn an informer 
to ensure release or lenient sentences (Ryan, 2001:4).     
 
The thirty (30) detective participants were requested to give their views on the motives 
of informers for relaying information.  All the participants are of the belief that the 
major motivation of informers for supplying information is to receive a monetary 
reward. In addition five (5) participants referred to the elimination of competition, whilst 
six (6) participants referred to double role motives.   
 
Billingsley et al. (2001:68) and Fitzgerald (2007:36) caution investigators to be 
cognizant of informers who play a double role.  On the one hand the person is seeking 
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the status of being a police informant, whilst he/she is promoting his/her own criminal 
activities on the other hand.  The so-called “selective informing” influences the 
direction of an investigation whilst it also has bearing on accountable and ethical 
practice.  It is the objective of the informer to learn how investigations are conducted 
and to identify agents, officers and other informers. It is the experience of the 
researcher that these informers often endeavour to create a position from where they 
can justify criminal activities.  They will argue that specific information was reported 
and that they are conducting investigations accordingly.  As mentioned above six (6) 
participants indicated that “double role” informers have a motive to enrich themselves 
and to benefit their own agendas.  One (1) of the six (6) participants mentioned the 
example of an informer that was used as a co-agent on the West-Rand.  It was 
discovered that the informer sent his own ill-gotten gold to an undercover operation, 
by means of his own couriers.  He benefited financially and misused his mandate to 
promote his own agenda.  
 
From the research it became apparent that not all investigators are cognizant of 
informers with ulterior motives and the elimination of rival groups.  Investigators’ 
responses could portray the environment in which they function.  Grounded on the 
research and experience of the researcher it is the belief of the researcher that 
financial motives, elimination of rival groups and ulterior motives are closely connected 
to precious metals investigations, due to the monetary incentives that it involves. 
 
 
3.7 Different roles of informers during undercover operations 
 
It is the experience of the researcher that the assignments given to undercover 
informers are of a broad scope.  The informer may be required to perform an array of 
tasks and to deviate from the original tasking due to changing circumstances.  The 
thirty (30) detective participants were requested to indicate what circumstances may 
direct an investigator to change the original role of the informer.  The following is a 
summary of their remarks: 
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• The informer grows in his/her role from information gatherer to a point where 
it is expected of him/her to act as an agent.  
• When the safety of the informer is at risk.  
• When the modus operandi of the syndicate changes. 
• When misconduct on behalf of the informer takes place that might jeopardise 
the investigation.  
• When the informer turns corrupt and blows the cover of the operation.  
 
Buckwalter (1983:136) claims that the tasks of an informer may vary from a simple 
assignment where it is required from the informer to conduct surveillance of premises 
to a highly sophisticated task where it is required of the informer to infiltrate a prime 
suspect and to gather evidence against the person.  Madinger (2000:207) shows that 
informers take a more active role in law-enforcement today than just giving information 
about crime in general.  They ostensibly participate in crime, under controlled 
circumstances.   
 
The thirty (30) detective participants were requested to mention the roles that an 
informer can be availed for during undercover operations.  These participants referred 
to an array of roles that an informer can be considered for.  The researcher agrees 
with the participants’ views on the different roles of informers, which are as follows: 
• Information and intelligence gathering. 
• Agent or co-agent. 
• Introduction of agents to suspects. 
• Infiltration of syndicates. 
• Observation and surveillance duties. 
 
3.7.1 The use of informers as agents 
 
Madinger (2000:207) and Fitzgerald (2007:141-142) stress the importance of 
independent corroboration of all statements by an informer who is used as an agent 
during an undercover operation.  It is necessitated by the fact that courts are nervous 
 73 
to accept the evidence of untrained, possibly criminal individuals.  Strong police 
control is essential under these circumstances.  Fitzgerald (2007:143) reports that 
optimal control over the informer and maximum corroboration of the evidence is 
imperative to ensure a conviction.  It is the experience of the researcher that a quest 
for corroboration will ensure that the active role of the informer is kept transparent, 
free of irregularities and admissible as evidence in a court of law.  
 
The thirty (30) detective participants and five (5) advocate participants were requested 
to elaborate on whether they would consider utilising informers in the role of an agent.   
 
Two (2) advocate participants remarked that they would not consider using informers 
in the role of agent due to the following reasons: 
• A propensity to have their own agendas.  
• They are contaminated with previous criminal activities and they are not 
always prepared to testify in court.  
 
The remaining three (3) advocate participants are prepared to make use of informers 
in the role of agent, because of the following reasons: 
• They are trusted by the syndicates.  
• They have inside knowledge about the syndicate activities and role players.  
 
Nine (9) of the thirty (30) detective participants are in agreement with the two (2) 
advocate participants and also pointed out that they will not consider using an 
informer in the role of an agent due to the following reasons: 
• The identity of the informer will be compromised and the informer privilege will 
have no effect. 
• The life of the informer might be in danger. 
• Informers are not properly trained to act as agents and to testify in court. 
• Informers are dubious characters with ulterior motives. They can not be trusted 
at all. 
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The remaining twenty one (21) detective participants embraced the view that they will 
make use of informers in the role of agent due to the following reasons: 
• They are trusted by the suspects. 
• Suspects would not continue with illegal transactions if the informer is not 
present. 
• Use the informer as a co-agent to corroborate the evidence of the police agent. 
• It will be advantageous to the investigation as the informer will be able to 
infiltrate police agents into the structures of the syndicate. 
 
The different views by the detectives and advocates indicate that they are not 
unanimous on whether to use or not to use an informer in the role of agent. An 
analysis of the responses directs that the advocates and detectives who are not in 
favour of using informers as agents base their responses on the following reasons:  
• Informers have ulterior motives and they are contaminated by previous 
criminal activities. 
• Informers need to be protected for future use and they must not be exposed 
in an open court. 
• Informers are not properly trained to act as agents. This view corresponds 
with Madinger (2000:207) and Fitzgerald (2007:141-142) as discussed 
above.  
 
The advocates and detectives who are in favour of utilising informers in the role of 
agent reflect that it may hold the following benefits: 
• Suspects trust informers and they will not continue with criminal activities if 
the informer is not present.  
• Informers have inside information on the compilation and identity of syndicate 
role players. 
• It will be advantageous to the investigation as the informer will be able to 
infiltrate police agents into the structures of the syndicate. 
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Based on the literature and views by the detective and advocate participants strong 
cases are made out on behalf of and against the use of informers as agents.  When 
an informer is used as an agent corroboration of evidence is paramount to ensure that 
justice is served.  Founded on the experience of the researcher the specific 
circumstances of each investigation will direct the investigation team to make an 
informed decision on whether to use the informer as an agent or not.  The advantages 
and consequences as purported by the detective and advocate participants, needs to 
be considered.  The credibility of the informer, his/her abilities, background, related 
experience and the task at hand will play a pivotal role in the decision making process.  
 
3.7.2 Introduction of agents to suspects 
 
Frazier (1994:173) argues that informers must only be used to introduce suspects to 
police agents and not to allow them to become agents or engage in undercover 
operations.  The thirty (30) detective participants were requested to mention the roles 
that an informer can be used for during undercover operations.  Three (3) participants 
embraced the view by Frazier (1994:173) that the informer should just introduce the 
agent to the suspect, where after he/she must withdraw.  The other twenty seven (27) 
participants referred to aspects as reflected in 3.7 supra.  Frazier (1994:173) further 
states that the undercover police agent must as soon as possible be the main role 
player.  Although the argument has merit it is also open to criticism, since many 
syndicates only trust the informer.  
 
It may be required of an informer to introduce an undercover policeman to the 
syndicate members and thereby create an opportunity for the agent to conduct 
controlled deliveries or purchases with the syndicate members.  It is the experience of 
the researcher that the informer should endeavour to withdraw from the transaction, 
after introducing the agents to the suspect.  It will ensure that police agents conduct 
the transaction. It will create an opportunity for the informer not to be exposed as the 
informer in an open court, since he/she did not actively participate in the transaction.   
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3.7.3 Intelligence gathering 
 
According to Brown (2001:127), it is important to ensure that information is credible, 
reliable and corroborated before it is utilised.  Frazier (1994:12) argues that 
undercover agents develop a large body of intelligence about criminal activities during 
an operation.  If the agent is not compromised his/her intelligence may lead to several 
ad hoc arrests.  It is the experience of the researcher that deploying an informer as an 
intelligence gatherer is an effective method of arresting precious metals syndicate role 
players and disrupting their activities without jeopardising the project.  The undercover 
agent is subsequently in a position to reach the upper echelon of a syndicate and 
gather intelligence that might lead to the successful arrest and prosecution of a 
precious metals syndicate.  
 
According to Newburn, Williamson and Wright (2007:427), organised crime 
investigations should be intelligence led. The use of informers to glean information is 
of utmost importance.  The information must be evaluated systematically.  Proactive 
investigative techniques can then be implemented to effectively address organised 
crime. 
 
Clarke et al. (2004:314) advise that informers are an effective tool to compile 
comprehensive profiles on suspects. The researcher is a member of the National 
Investigation Task Team.  As a result of his position he has access to statistics of the 
task team.  The statistics are informal statistics kept by the Team itself.  The task team 
is currently conducting eleven intelligence driven investigations.  Eight of these 
investigations commenced as a result of informer participation.  It is the experience of 
the researcher that informers are especially effective and of great assistance during 
the intelligence gathering phase of an undercover operation.   
 
The thirty (30) detective participants were requested to mention the roles that an 
informer can be used for during a precious metals undercover operation.  The 
following is a summary of their responses made with regards to intelligence gathering: 
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• Informers are excellent sources of crime information and intelligence due to 
their special relationship with criminals.  
• Informers are especially valuable by infiltrating syndicates without participating 
actively in the activities of the syndicate. 
• They are invaluable to determine: 
o modus operandi of the syndicate  
o operational areas and illegal smelt houses  
o associates of the syndicate 
o hierarchy of the syndicate 
o money laundering activities by the syndicate 
• The importance of an electronic database to capture, analyse, corroborate and 
present information to benefit the effective utilisation of intelligence was also 
mentioned by the participating detectives.  
 
From the above discussion it has become eminent that intelligence gathering is an 
important cornerstone to be effective with undercover police operations.  The 
consulted literature and detective participants directs that intelligence gathered 
enables investigators to act proactively.  Information supplied by the informer may 
lead to the arrest of syndicate role players, profiling of syndicate members and the 
seizure of illicit commodities and cash without compromising the position of the 
informer. 
 
3.7.4 The use of surveillance  
 
Surveillance is the monitoring of behaviour.  The word “surveillance” stems from 
French and literally means “watching over” (Surveillance, 2009). The term refers to all 
forms of observation and monitoring. It includes electronic surveillance, direct 
observation and observations with binoculars.  The word is often used to describe all 
forms of observation or monitoring, not just visual observation (Surveillance, 2009).  
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Gilbert (2007:382) purports that surveillance is a secretive, close watch kept over 
persons, objects and locations.  The New English Usage Dictionary (2001:887) 
defines surveillance as: “a close watch kept on someone or something”.   
  
Surveillance is a useful method to investigate criminal activity and to gather evidence 
(Surveillance, 2009).  Gilbert (2007:382) embrace the view that surveillance is one of 
the most frequently used techniques to secure arrests and convictions.  Gilbert 
(2007:384) depicts that surveillance duties has the following purposes to: 
• gather evidence by observing the activities within a premises  
• protect and document the movement of an undercover agent 
• obtain information for future use 
 
Several types of surveillance are in existence.  Surveillance (2009) depicts that the 
following types of surveillance are frequently used:  Computer surveillance, aerial 
surveillance, surveillance cameras, human operatives, satellite imagery and counter 
surveillance.  
 
Buckwalter (1983:147), Frazier (1994:145-154) and Clarke et al. (2004:325) stress the 
importance of counter surveillance for agents and informers to protect themselves.  
Counter surveillance can be described as the practice of avoiding surveillance or 
making surveillance difficult.  
 
Buckwalter (1983:130) is of the opinion that the so-called “In-the-area assignments” 
cover a wide range of undercover activities.  The informer needs to create a reason 
for being in a specific location for the duration of the undercover operation.  
Buckwalter (1983:130) stresses that whatever the operative pretends to be doing he 
must be able to do it effectively.  According to Gilbert (2007:383), surveillance duties 
consist of both moving and static surveillance.  Moving surveillance may either be by 
foot, vehicle or air.  Static surveillance on the contrary involves no movement during 
the initial stages, since a specific premises and or person are observed. It is the 
experience of the researcher that only foot and static surveillance is applicable to 
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informers, since it does not require many resources.  Vehicle surveillance (moving 
surveillance) is a specialised field that requires extensive resources and expertise and 
it is therefore not advisable to use informers in this role.  An informer may, however, 
conduct static surveillance from a vehicle. 
 
From the literature it is clear that surveillance is an effective manner to gather 
evidence and intelligence against suspects.  Surveillance consists of a broad scope of 
activities.  Based on the literature and experience of the researcher he is of the 
opinion that the nature and or the location of the surveillance to be conducted will 
determine the strategy to be followed.   
 
 
3.8 Aspects to consider when engaging in an undercover operation 
 
Buckwalter (1983:142) asserts that thought should be given to multiple aspects when 
planning an undercover operation.  The author is of the opinion that secrecy is the 
most important aspect of any undercover operation.  Frazier (1994:9) indicates that 
effectiveness of an undercover operation is determined by how well some of the 
variables involved are managed. 
 
The thirty (30) detective participants were requested to elaborate on aspects that 
require consideration when engaging in an undercover operation.  Their responses 
are summarised as follows: 
• Training of the informer. 
• Profile of the informer. 
• Protection of the informer. 
• Secrecy and cover story of the operation. 
• Corroboration of information. 
• Payment to the informer. 
• Operational rules (Informer handling).  
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The thirty (30) detective and five (5) advocate participants were requested to list the 
problems which they encounter with informers during undercover operations.  Their 
responses are as follows: 
• Nine (9) participants mentioned that a limited amount of informers entice 
suspects to commit crime. 
• Seven (7) participants cited excessive drinking as a frequent reason for failure 
in the past. 
• Three (3) participants reported that informers becomes so anxious to conduct 
a transaction that they aboard all safety rules. 
• Four (4) participants referred to informers that act beyond their mandate. 
• Nine (9) participants mentioned poor reporting abilities, both verbally and 
orally. 
• Eleven (11) participants pointed to sub-standard informer handling that 
contributes to informers acting in an unacceptable manner. 
The five (5) advocate participants reported as follows: 
• Three (3) participants referred to informers that supply information that is not 
factually correct. 
• All five (5) participants mentioned that some informers revert to enticement to 
obtain successes. 
• Two (2) participants referred to informers with ulterior agendas as a matter of 
concern. 
• One (1) participant mentioned that some informers that were used as witnesses 
in the past did not make a good impression to court. 
 
The remarks from the thirty (30) detective and five (5) advocate participants directs 
that they encounter numerous problems with informers during precious metals 
undercover operations.  The researcher agrees that investigators often have to deal 
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with various challenges when informers are used to obtain information.  Despite all the 
challenges it remains a very valuable tool to obtain information to solve cases.  In 
order for investigators to obtain the determined objectives it is necessary that the 
problems are properly attended to by focussing on the under-mentioned aspects. 
 
3.8.1 Training and developing informers 
 
Barefoot (1995:25) emphasises that training is to the benefit of the organisation, since 
it increases the likelihood of winning a case and it increases the safety of the informer.  
The thirty (30) detective participants were requested to mention which aspects they 
attend to when training an informer for an undercover operation.  All thirty (30) 
detective participants claimed that only reliable and experienced informers must be 
used to engage into precious metals undercover operations.  It is imperative for the 
agent and or informer to be properly trained before the commencement of the 
operation.  A single training session will not suffice.  Follow-up training sessions are 
important to succeed with the development of the informer.  The thirty (30) detective 
participants pointed out that the following aspects need attention during training: 
• Legal aspects. (All thirty (30) the participants agreed) 
• Gathering of evidence. (Thirteen (13) participants mentioned this aspect) 
• Evidence giving. (Six (6) participants referred to this aspect) 
• Report writing. (Twenty six (26) participants referred to this aspect) 
• Operational training (Twenty one (21) participants) 
• The tasking at hand: Who are the targets and what the investigative strategy 
is. (Seventeen (17) participants) 
• Observation abilities. (One (1) participant mentioned this aspect)  
 
As purported by the detective participants the important aspects that need attention 
during training include the following: 
• Legal aspects: All thirty (30) detective participants share the view that 
informers must be trained in respect of the stipulations of section 252(A) of the 
Criminal Procedure Act, Act 51/1977.  The contents of the section and mandate 
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of the authority must be explained to the agent and informer.  The informer 
must know what the boundaries of his/her conduct will be. It is important for the 
informer to know that he/she may not take on the leading role to commit crime 
and thereby influence and encourage the suspect to commit criminal conduct.  
In addition three (3) detective participants recommended that the designated 
prosecuting advocate of the Director of Public Prosecutions would be the most 
suitable person to conduct the training. Fitzgerald (2007:245) embraces the 
view of the detectives by reiterating that training of informers with regards to 
legal aspects will ensure that informers act correctly and minimise claims of 
enticement.  It is the opinion of the researcher that the need for proper training 
on legal aspects can not be over emphasised, since nine (9) detective 
participants reported enticement by informers and four (4) detective participants 
reported that some informers act beyond their mandate, as problems that they 
encountered with informers during undercover operations. In addition all five (5) 
advocate participants referred to the enticement aspect.              
• Suspected role players within the precious metals domain:  The agent 
needs to know who is in the market, where and to what extend are they 
involved. The agent must know who is associated with whom and who is in 
competition with each other. One (1) detective participant made the valid 
remark that an association-chart will suffice to illustrate the connections 
between the suspects and who is to be addressed. The remaining sixteen (16) 
detective participants reported that briefing sessions will be sufficient to convey 
the necessary information to the informer and agent(s). 
• Evidence giving:   Four (4) detective participants advised that experienced, 
well trained detectives should conduct this important aspect.  Two (2) detective 
participants stressed the importance that the trainer must have knowledge and 
experience of precious metals undercover operations and testimony. One (1) 
advocate participant mentioned that some informers that were used as 
witnesses in the past did not make a good impression to court. This is indicative 
of a quest for proper and intensive training.   
 83 
• Evidence gathering:  Three (3) detective participants indicated that agents 
need to maintain the chain of evidence. The researcher supports their view 
since the proper sealing and handling of precious metals exhibits are important 
building blocks in cases of this nature. The other ten (10) detective participants 
mentioned that evidence gathering must focus on comprehensive statements, 
video and audio material and photo albums to corroborate the evidence.    
• Observation and memory abilities:  Only one (1) detective participant 
referred to this aspect as an important aspect during training.  Buckwalter 
(1983:139) advised that a good memory is imperative, since many events may 
occur in a short space of time and the agent must be able to reflect on the 
events comprehensively and in detail.  Based on the experience of the 
researcher it is advised that informers are trained by experienced, professional 
individuals in the field of surveillance.       
• Report writing:  The thirty (30) detective participants were requested to 
mention which problems they encounter during undercover operations. Seven 
(7) detective participants remarked that intelligence reports are sub-standard 
and incomprehensive. Two (2) detective participants remarked that important 
information is not embodied in reports.   These participants referred to full 
particulars of suspects, addresses and registration numbers that are omitted 
from reports.  The researcher advises that the informer handler must compile a 
list of aspects that need to be embodied in intelligence reports.  It must be 
brought to the attention of the informer for compliance.  The remaining twenty-
one (21) detective participants mentioned other aspects, as discussed above.  
According to Barefoot (1995:101), report writing is essential during an 
undercover assignment, since agents tend to incorporate more detail in written 
reports.  These reports may be tendered as evidence in upcoming criminal 
matters. 
• Operational training: Frazier (1994:16) shows that the knowledge and 
experience of former undercover agents may be utilised to train and develop 
other undercover agents. As mentioned above, twenty one (21) detective 
participants referred to the importance of operational training to empower the 
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informer for his role.  The remaining nine (9) detective participants did not 
mention this important aspect.  The twenty one (21) detective participants 
advised that the informer must be fully knowledgeable and conversant with the 
following aspects: 
o How to refine gold & platinum. 
o Calculating and determining percentages and prices of the commodities. 
o Applicable terminology and the meaning of the words, like for instance 
“mat, mercury and amalgam”.  
o The identification of the different forms of the commodities. 
 
The fact that all the participants support the need for training confirms that proper and 
practical training is required to ensure successful undercover operations. The 
researcher reiterates that the training needs to be applicable and valuable to precious 
metals undercover operations. An analysis of the responses by the detective 
participants directs that they do not all agree on all the important aspects that require 
training before the commencement of an undercover operation. It could be as a result 
of their perception of aspects that require training.   
 
3.8.2 Informer handling  
 
Billingsley et al. (2001:63) take a strong stand by arguing that: “Formal, documented, 
and strict risk management through fully evaluated training, rigorous supervision and 
quality assurance systems will be the only way that the police service can continue to 
practice the use of informers with majority public consent and minimize the chances of 
further damaging instances of abuse”.  
 
Billingsley et al. (2001:12) indicate that effective handling and exploitation of 
information calls for judgment, experience and management of risk.  According to 
Billingsley et al. (2001:56), the use of proactive methods such as informers and 
undercover operations rely on deceiving the target and therefore the systems need to 
be properly managed to ensure justification.  Eleven (11) detective participants cited 
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sub-standard informer handling as an aspect that contributes to informers acting in an 
unacceptable manner.  The remaining detective participants cited other reasons, as 
discussed above. 
 
According to Brown (2001:125), it is important to provide for proper and adequate 
control over informers.  This will ensure that the informer does not embarrass the 
handler or department at a later stage.  Brown (2001:125) agrees with Madinger 
(2000:98-99,123-138) by stating that it is important to adhere to the following aspects 
to maintain proper informer management: 
• Never threaten, bluster or bluff.  This argument is open to debate, as it is the 
experience of the researcher that a bluff at the right time may instantly 
motivate a non co-operative informer to deliver the required results.  It is 
further an effective manner to test a suspected “double role” informer. 
• Establish and maintain control over the informer.  Fitzgerald (2007:237) and 
Clarke et al. (2004:322) point out that it is essential that informers know what 
their mandate is and they must obey instructions and tasks at all times.  In 
addition Gilbert (2007:137) justifiably argues that the handler must always 
control the informer and not visa versa.  These three authors agree that the 
informer is not permitted to act on own discretion.   
• Mutual respect is imperative to establish rapport and to be effective with 
informer management.  Gilbert (2007:138) adds that trust is the cornerstone of 
the relationship between the handler and the informer.  
• Effective communication is a pre-requisite.  Two-way communication is 
imperative to succeed in effective informer handling.  It is important that both 
parties need to understand each other and the expectations of both parties. 
The handler needs to be capable of extracting information from the agent or 
informer in an orderly and chronological manner.    
• Share information.  It is important that every piece of information is used to its 
potential maximum. If it is necessary to divulge information to another unit, do 
so as it will be to the benefit of the organisation. 
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• See to it that the informer sticks to the rules brought to his/her attention when 
he/she was registered.  Always have a copy of this agreement available. 
• Document information properly by means of entries into the operational 
informer file, affidavits and notes.  
• Evaluate and assess the informer regularly. 
• Ethics and informer management: 
o Do not accept or take anything from an informer except his/her 
information.  The Code of Conduct of the Precious Metals and Diamond 
Unit directs that no member should become familiar with an informer.  
Based on the experience of the researcher he agrees with Lambrechts 
(2005:679) that an investigator should never become familiar with an 
informer, since your informer of today may be your suspect of 
tomorrow. 
o Do not overlook criminal activity by the informer.  Billingsley et al. 
(2001:26) point out that it is necessary for police to manage informers 
in such a manner that they do not believe that they have a “license to 
deal”.  Since many informers themselves are involved with criminal 
activities, it is important to also investigate their activities and not to 
favour them because of their participation. 
o Do not use the informer to commit crime, unless it is authorised by the 
Director of Public Prosecutions. 
• Emergency contacts.  It is important for a handler to be available to adhere 
and react to calls from informers.  It may just be the breakthrough that is 
needed to conclude an investigation.  
• Important aspects to consider with regards to meetings with informers: 
o Never meet the informer at a Police station or offices of the 
investigative unit. 
o Place of meeting - a car, safe house or public places. 
o Always have a witness present. 
o Prepare yourself in advance for a meeting. 
o Listen carefully to what the informer has to say. 
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o Task the informer unambiguously.  
o Debrief the informer comprehensively.  
 
The researcher proposes that investigators need to keep to the above-mentioned 
golden rules of informer handling to be successful with this discipline.  The answers by 
the detective participants clearly direct that some investigators lack proper informer 
handling skills.    
   
3.8.3 Legend of an undercover operation 
 
Buckwalter (1983:142) and Van Rooyen (2001:138) concur that the success of an 
undercover operation depends on how well the agent lives his/her role, the 
surroundings, the circumstances and above all his relationships with his associates. 
These authors discuss the point comprehensively and argue that the cover story or 
legend of an undercover operative must be realistic and believable.  The cover story 
must always be true to real-life situations.  The legend or cover story refers to the 
fictitious background, occupation and life that the agent assumes during the 
undercover operation. 
 
Buckwalter (1983:136-137), Frazier (1994:155-161) and Van Rooyen (2001:138-139) 
point out that the following aspects need to be adhered to for the legend to hold up: 
• An undercover operation requires that the agent assumes another lifestyle. 
The legend must be carefully created and planned in a manner that the agent 
is comfortable with.  The agent needs to be able to live the assumed life. 
Frazier (1994:155) stresses that the deeper the agent infiltrates a syndicate 
the more sound the legend needs to be.  High profile suspects are 
professionals with the necessary links to check out the agent’s identity. 
Frazier (1994:155) states that syndicate leaders recruit corrupt police officials 
to verify the cover of the agents and to educate syndicates on police methods 
and techniques.     
• The legend must be developed to be inline with the suspects to be infiltrated. 
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• The legend must fit the agent’s profile.  If you act as a rich businessman you 
need to fit into the role by dressing smartly and driving around in a luxurious 
vehicle.  Lyman (2000:26) reports that the agent must be equipped with 
documents that coincides his undercover identity.   
• The undercover operative needs to prepare himself to live the role 
convincingly, naturally and effectively, while maintaining secrecy of his true 
identity. It is important for agents to act, speak and react like criminals during 
the undercover operation.  Agents must refrain from acting as policemen 
would do under specific circumstances.  It may lead to the exposure of the 
agent.       
• It is advised that only the agents surname to be changed, but to stick to his 
first name. This will ensure that the informer is not easily exposed. 
• Identification documents should be kept to a minimum.  A fictitious driver’s 
license and identity document is a prerequisite. 
• An instant criminal record will definitely pave the way for an agent to infiltrate 
a syndicate.  The agent must be aware not to be bragging about certain 
events that he cannot give account for.  For example that he /she served time 
in a prison without even knowing the location of the prison or the wardens.     
• The duration of the undercover operation will determine the degree of cover 
that is required by the agent.  If the operation continues for a prolonged period 
the informer/agent will need to have real life acting ability.  
 
The discussion by the authors directs that agents need to be cognizant of the 
identified aspects to protect their cover story. 
 
3.8.4 Corroboration of information      
 
According to Madinger (2000:132), corroboration for an informer’s information is an 
important mechanism to control the informer and to keep him/her truthful.  If the 
informer knows that his/her information will be verified he/she will be deterred from 
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lying.  Fitzgerald (2007:171) emphasises that failure to corroborate information may 
have devastating consequences.   
 
Gilbert (2007:137), Madinger (2000:133) and Ryan (2001) agree by stating that the 
following ways are essential in trying to corroborate information: 
• Undercover agents must be infiltrated, with or without the knowledge of the 
informer. 
• Other informers.  The information can be checked against the other informer’s 
version.        
• Surveillance on the informer.  It will be an indication of the involvement of the 
informer and accuracy of the information. 
• Monitoring of conversations. The conversations between the informer and 
suspects may be intercepted to verify his information. 
• Background checking. Compare information with the outcome of previous 
information tendered by the informer. It will give the investigator a good idea of 
the reliability of the informer and the general accuracy of the information. 
  
Based on the experience of the researcher he agrees with the viewpoints of the 
authors of the literature consulted, since it is practice during precious metals 
undercover operations to corroborate information from informers.  Informers can never 
be tasked properly and accurately, if information was not properly evaluated and 
refined to a usable product.  
 
3.8.5 Protection of informers 
 
According to Buckwalter (1983:145) and Gilbert (2007:138-139), the informer is to a 
large extent responsible for his/her own personal safety. Buckwalter (1983:145) 
indicates that the informer can secure his own safety by being constantly alert when in 
the presence of the suspects.  The informer needs to constantly observe their 
attitudes.  
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Buckwalter (1983:147), Frazier (1994:145-154) and Clarke et al. (2004:325) concur by 
indicating that there are numerous hazards and cautions that the agent or informer 
needs to be aware of when conducting an undercover operation.  The most important 
are listed below:  
• The agent must refrain from getting arrested, since it may expose his true 
identity.  Never carry a police identity or personal identification document.  
Syndicate members may attempt to determine the true identity of the agent by 
either letting him/her get arrested or acquiring the services of corrupt 
policeman to do a check-up on your past. Anticipate all possibilities.  
• Frazier (1994:146) warns that agents should be cognisant of being set up 
during an undercover operation.  He suggests that the agent should always 
determine the location, time and place for the transaction.  This argument is 
open for criticism, since precious metals suspects are well equipped for 
transactions at their “business premises” and they require of the agent(s) to 
conduct transactions at these premises. 
• Agents should not be overzealous by asking direct questions about the 
syndicate activities.  This might arouse suspicion on the side of the syndicate.  
The undercover agent should be cognisant not to interrogate the associates. 
The thirty (30) detective participants were requested to list the problems that 
they encounter with informers during undercover operations.  Three (3) 
participants confirmed this view by commenting that it is their experience that 
some informers becomes so anxious to conduct a transaction that they 
aboard all safety rules.  The remaining twenty seven (27) participants referred 
to aspects, as indicated above. 
• Telephone numbers of the investigation team must be memorised and not 
stalled on the memory of the informer’s mobile phone. 
• Never take any associate, manager, co-worker into your confidence by 
revealing your true identity and the nature of the assignment.  Van Rooyen 
(2001:140) cautions agents never to reveal their true identity. 
• All communications must be dealt with in a secret manner. No notes, 
statements and reports must be accessible to any outsiders or suspects. 
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Important aspects need to be memorised and documented at a later stage 
(Van Rooyen, 2001:140).  If the need arises to have a meeting with the 
handlers it must be conducted at a safe house after proper counter 
surveillance was conducted. Frazier (1994:61) emphasises the importance of 
a safe house by stating that a safe house is the location where intelligence 
files and criminal cases are protected from outsiders.  It is imperative that no 
unauthorised people overhear conversations.    
• A contingency plan must be decided upon for unplanned and emergency 
occurrences. Frazier (1994:143) suggests that a handler should train his 
undercover operatives for foreseeable emergencies, although it is not possible 
to predict all possible emergencies.   Agents are to make the correct decisions 
to avoid disaster. 
• The agent must refrain from sexual encounters and excessive drinking.      
Frazier (1994:90) stresses, that sexual relationships may be the reason for the 
agent to be exposed and the undercover operation to end up in a disaster.  
The thirty (30) detective participants were requested to list the problems that 
they encounter with informers during undercover operations. Seven (7) 
participants and Van Rooyen (2001:140) cited excessive drinking as a 
frequent reason for failure in the past.  The remaining twenty three (23) 
participants cited various other reasons, as reflected above.   
• Counter surveillance is important to secure that the agent, handler and safe 
house is not exposed.  
  
Based on the literature consulted, the responses by the participants and the 
experience of the researcher he believes that all the cited aspects are valid and need 
to be addressed with the informers before and during an undercover operation. 
Informers and agents who are reluctant to adhere to the stipulations may endanger 
their lives and the investigation may be compromised to such an extent that it needs 
to be terminated. 
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3.8.6 Profile of informer    
 
Buckwalter (1983:139) indicates that the following personal characteristics are needed 
for an agent to be successful with an undercover operation: 
• General type of personality.  A good actor, cool-headed, a resourceful 
imagination, self-confidence and the ability to think quickly. It is important for 
the agent to be unobtrusive, self-disciplined and able to control his feelings.  A 
good memory is imperative, since many events may occur in a short space of 
time and the agent must be able to reflect on the events comprehensively and 
in detail.  Van Rooyen (2001:137) adds that the agent must always be a 
gregarious person and never an introvert.  The researcher agrees with this 
view as it is the primary goal of the agent to infiltrate a syndicate. He needs to 
act in such a manner that he is trusted by the syndicate members. 
• Adaptability. The agent must be able to assume any role as required from 
him as if it is his natural environment. 
• Good judgement. The agent needs to be able to make the correct decision 
under difficult circumstances, after a quick evaluation of the events that is 
unfolding. Gilbert (2007:377) embraces the view by reporting that an 
undercover operative must be quick thinking, since there are no ways to 
prepare for unpredictable situations.   
• Effective communicator. An art which can contribute towards the speedily 
infiltration of the identified targets or to the exposure of the agent if he is not 
able to talk himself out of trouble. Not only is it essential to communicate well 
with the syndicate members, but also with the investigation team. Verbal and 
written communication skills are necessitated. It is the experience of the 
researcher that the informer needs to be computer literate to be able to 
communicate with the investigation team electronically when briefing and 
debriefing sessions is out of the question. It is an effective manner to 
communicate if the situation permits.  
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According to Frazier (1994:90), fear and anxiety may also jeopardise an operation if 
an undercover agent is not able to control his feelings and emotions. It is therefore 
necessary to properly evaluate an informer before engaging into an undercover 
operation.  
 
The thirty (30) detective participants were requested to list the personal attributes of 
the informer that are taken into consideration when deciding on the role for the 
informer. Their responses are summarised as follows:   
• The race and gender of the informer is an important consideration. The person 
needs to associate with the suspects on a personal level. It is therefore 
important for the informer to blend in with the surroundings. 
• The informer must be an effective communicator. 
• Previous experience of undercover operations. 
• Reliability and trustworthiness. 
• The personality of the informer. The informer must be able to remain focussed 
under difficult circumstances and he or she must be acceptable to the 
syndicate that he or she needs to infiltrate.   
 
Not one of the participants referred to the language issue.   Based on the researcher’s 
experience it is to the benefit of the investigation if the informer is capable of 
communicating with the syndicate members in their mother tongue.  Informers who 
are from the same descent as the suspects relate easier to those people and it 
facilitate the infiltration of the syndicate. 
 
From the discussion it is eminent that the authors and participants are at heart that the 
correct person needs to be identified for the undercover operation. It is imperative that 
the informer fits into the situation and not visa versa. The mentioned attributes need to 
be considered to make an informed decision on the undercover operative.       
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3.8.7 Remuneration 
 
3.8.7.1 Payment of informers 
 
Madinger (2000:214) strongly warns against the determining of a reward for a specific 
informer to gather evidence against a specific suspect.  It may lead to deception, 
enticement and untruthfulness on the side of the informer.  In the case of S v Corns 
1993 (2) SACR 350 (NCD) the informer received a partly reward of one thousand rand 
before testifying.  The court on appeal ruled that the situation was fraught with 
possibilities of bribery and extortion.  On the contrary Madinger (2000:210) advises 
that the informer must be paid before testifying, because it will refute an argument by 
the defence that the informer is lying under oath to obtain a conviction and secure a 
reward.      
 
Lambrechts (2005:641) asserts that a conviction is not a pre-requisite for the payment 
of a one-third reward, under section 3 of the Finance and Financial Adjustments Act 
Consolidation Act, Act 11 of 1977.  The author indicates that seizure and forfeiture of 
precious metals and or money are the determinations for this type of reward.  Based 
on the facts as set out by Lambrechts (2005:641) above, the researcher is of the 
opinion that it must be brought to the attention of the trial court that a conviction is not 
needed for payment of the reward to the informer.  It is imperative that the informer, 
acting as an agent, should duly be informed of this stipulation.  This will increase the 
credibility of the informer, since he will have no motive to colour a picture that will 
favour the prosecution.  
  
The thirty (30) detective participants were requested to state and motivate if they 
would pay an informer before or after testifying.  Seventeen (17) detective participants 
argued that they will remunerate the informer after testifying.  The participants 
asserted that it will direct the informer to remain faithful in court by remaining to his 
statement.  Another contention by the participants is that an informer might refuse to 
testify or abscond and thereby jeopardise the case.  Three (3) detective participants 
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contended that the specific circumstances of the matter on hand will determine the 
approach.  These participants propose that a pre-determined percentage of the 
reward may be paid to the informer, since these types of cases has a tendency to 
drag out for long periods.  Ten (10) detective participants however remarked that they 
would pay the informer before testifying, as it will minimise an attack by the defence 
that he/she has a financial motive to testify.  They are therefore in agreement with 
Madinger (2000:210) who also believe that it is better to pay the informer before he or 
she has to testify in court. 
 
The discussion above directs that the authors and participants are not in agreement 
on the procedure to be followed in this regard.  It is important to recognise that both 
arguments have merit, because the views of the participants are corroborated by the 
different authors and reported judgment.  Based on the literature and views by the 
participants the researcher is of the opinion that the specific circumstances of the case 
will determine the procedure to be followed.   It is the belief of the researcher that the 
sting of the attack on the payment of rewards will be refuted, by always indicating to 
court that a conviction is not the only determining factor or a pre-requisite when 
deciding on a reward for the informer.  
  
3.8.7.2 Type of rewards 
 
On the question put to the thirty (30) detective participants on the type of rewards that 
are applicable to precious metals investigations the explanations of the participants 
were summarised as follows: 
• Operational expenses.  The purpose of this incentive is to reimburse the 
informer for expenses incurred with regards to a specific police action or 
undercover operation 
• Monthly rewards.  This type of reward is specifically valuable, where an 
informer is involved with an undercover operation over a prolonged period of 
time. The payment may be the same every month or vary.  The specific 
circumstances of the operation will direct the route to follow. It is advisable to 
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draw up an agreement or contract with the informer to ensure that both parties 
are protected.  Under circumstances where an informer is remunerated over 
the period of the undercover operation it is unlikely that the informer will receive 
a one-third reward, after the completion of the court cases.  A merit reward may 
be considered if the informer produced high quality work during the operation 
and the objectives were achieved.   
• One-third reward.  The reward is justified under section 3 of the Finance and 
Financial Adjustments Act Consolidation Act, Act 11 of 1977. This type of 
reward is only payable after completion of the criminal case (Section 3 of the 
Finance and Financial Adjustments Act Consolidation Act).  
 
According to the South African Police Service National Instruction 2/2001 (par. 24) the 
following criteria; as reflected on the SAPS 164; are used to determine the reward for 
an informer: 
• Seriousness of the offence. 
• Value of the information. 
• Degree of difficulty of the investigation. 
• Actual time and effort spend by an informer to obtain the information. 
• Level of infiltration. 
• Judicial process, continuance of services and giving of evidence.  
• Priority of particular crime. 
• Informers motive for co-operation. 
• Value of the commodities seized. 
 
Fitzgerald (2007:70) and Clarke et al. (2004:327) point out that informer’s may be paid 
for services rendered and expenses incurred. Specific considerations are helpful in 
determining the amount.  From the discussion it is clear that the detective participants 
have sufficient knowledge on the different options available to them, to properly 
remunerate informers.  The researcher is satisfied with the criteria of the South African 
Police Service, since it is a comprehensive list of aspects that needs to be embodied 
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in an application for a reward.  This minimise the possibility that important aspects are 
omitted from the application. 
 
3.9 Summary 
 
In order for investigators to optimally utilise informers it is imperative to have sufficient 
knowledge and experience about the types of informers, their motives, the difference 
between an informer and an agent and legal aspects with regards to this intelligence 
source.  No police service can sufficiently combat crime without informers.  Therefore 
it is important to properly manage, train and utilise informers to the benefit of the 
institution at large. 
 
Informers deployed during precious metals undercover operations may be required to 
fulfil an array of roles during the undercover operation.  The task at hand and the 
profile of the informer shall determine which role is most suitable for the person under 
the specific circumstances.  The use of informers and undercover operations will not 
diminish, but it is important for transparent and effective law enforcement to use these 
investigative tools in a responsible manner.  The following chapter is the concluding 
chapter where findings and recommendations are made to address the research 
problem and provide answers to the research questions. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
            CONCLUSION 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The decision to conduct research on this topic was as a result of the criticism against 
undercover operations and the role of the informer during these operations.  The 
judiciary and users of undercover police operations have further pointed at various 
problems with regard to the use of informers such as: Informers exceeding the 
boundaries of their mandate, informer handling is sub-standard, inferior control over 
informers and insufficient corroboration during evidence-gathering.  
 
The aim of the research is therefore to establish what undercover police operations 
entail and to determine how informers should be used by detectives during precious 
metals undercover operations. 
 
In order to achieve the aims and address the shortcomings and problems with the use 
of informers the researcher formulated two research questions.  The research was 
then conducted and the following research questions were answered: 
• What do undercover police operations entail? 
• How could informers be used during undercover police operations? 
The research questions enabled the researcher to focus on the identified problem and 
ensure that findings and recommendations relate to the research problem.  
 
A sample of thirty (30) detectives from the National Investigation Task Team was 
selected from the universe of detectives in the South African Police Service. The 
sample is regarded as representative of only the target population namely the 
detectives of the National Investigation Task Team. The findings of this study can thus 
only be valid for all detectives stationed at the National Investigation Task Team, since 
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all of them had an equal chance of being included in the study. A relatively large 
sample was selected (75%), namely 30 of the 40 detectives stationed at the National 
Investigation Task Team. However, there is a high probability that these findings might 
also be valid for all the other detectives who deal with similar cases since all of these 
police officials received the same basic training. All of these police officials are 
suppose to follow the same national prescribed procedures in handling informers and. 
Investigations are regulated and prescribed by the same organisational policies, 
guidelines and directives. It remains, however, only an assumption since the sample 
size is too small to be representative of the entire detective service and did the police 
officials from other investigation units not stand a chance of being included in the 
sample.     
 
This chapter will provide information on what was discovered within the research.  The 
findings and recommendations that were made relate to the initial research problem, 
aims and research questions.  The researcher believes that if the findings and 
recommendations can be implemented in practice it could enhance precious metals 
undercover operations to a great extent.   
 
   
4.2 Findings 
 
The research findings are based on secondary information obtained from national and 
international literature sources and primary information from the interviews with police 
detectives and state advocates.  
 
4.2.1 Research question 1: What do undercover police operations entail? 
 
The research revealed the following: 
• Undercover police operations are integral to forensic investigation, since it is a 
scientific method to gather evidence against precious metals perpetrators.  
Undercover operations may be concluded on an ad hoc basis or over a 
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prolonged period of time.   It is a covert investigative method that is conducted 
in secrecy where the police make use of agents to propose criminal conduct to 
syndicate role players.  Comprehensive evidence and intelligence are 
subsequently gathered against the identified syndicate role players.  
Undercover operations are an effective method to obtain and maintain control 
over organised crime.  Undercover operations are an excellent barometer to 
determine the extent of organised crime.  It gives investigators a clear view of 
the compilation of a syndicate and the roles of leaders, runners and associates. 
It is of paramount importance that the conduct of the informers and the agents 
do not go beyond the creating of an opportunity to commit an offence.  That will 
ensure that the evidence obtained by means of an undercover operation will be 
adjudicated to be admissible in a court of law.   
• Forensic investigation is synonymous to criminal investigation, since both 
concepts have the aim to ensure litigation, both criminally and civilly. Scientific 
knowledge needs to be applied for it to be classified as forensic investigation. 
Undercover operations and informers are likewise part of forensic investigation, 
since it has the same objectives.  Stolen precious metals are recovered during 
an undercover operation, evidence and intelligence are gathered and suspects 
are arrested and brought before court to serve justice.  Crime prevention in 
action is when prospected perpetrators are discouraged to commit these crimes 
when they take notice of similar operations and the successes that it produced. 
• Undercover operations are a justified method to gather evidence against 
suspected precious metals syndicate role players under the following 
circumstances: 
• There must be a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct against the 
suspect. An affidavit based on facts by the informer, agent or 
investigating officer will suffice to create the suspicion. 
• Serious crime must be committed or planned.  Example: Organised 
crime, precious metals related offences or murder. 
• Responsible, credible organisations and persons with a good character 
must lead these investigations like for instance SAPS detectives. 
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• The golden threat towards fair undercover operations is that the idea to 
commit crime must be born from the mind of the suspect and a 
reasonable suspicion must exist against such a person before an 
undercover operation may be launched against the syndicate.  
Undercover operations are the tried and tested method to properly 
investigate precious metals investigations. 
• Negative juris prudence over undercover operations is the consequence of the 
irresponsible actions and conduct by informers and agents.  They brought the 
system into disrepute.  Criticism against the system is vested in the application 
of the system and not the system per se.  Criticism against the use of 
undercover operations is justified under the following circumstances:  
Enticement by informers who are mostly dubious characters, unacceptable 
tactics like deception are used to lure suspects into the commissioning of an 
offence, fabrication of evidence, police corruption and abuse of the judicial 
process.  
• Undercover operations are sufficiently judicially demarcated by means of the 
following measures: 
• Section 252(A) of the Criminal Procedure Act, Act 51 of 1977. This 
section is the corner stone for the South African Police Service to ensure 
that undercover operations are fairly set. Investigators, agents and 
informers need to comply with the contents of the section to ensure that 
evidence thus obtained is admissible in court. 
• Section 208 of the Criminal Procedure Act, Act 51 of 1977. 
• Section 35 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 
1996. 
• Reported judgments. 
• Insufficient directives are in place to regulate Undercover Operations within the 
South African Police Service.  
• Not all users of precious metals undercover operations have sufficient 
knowledge of judicial measures to regulate undercover operations.  
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• The participating detectives are not completely conversant with the meaning of 
forensic investigation and what it encompasses.  
 
4.2.2  Research question 2: How could informers be used during undercover police 
operations? 
 
It was established that: 
• Informers and undercover operations are interrelated and closely connected. 
Undercover operations will not be successful without the use of informers. 
Informers are an indispensable method to gather information, intelligence and 
evidence against suspected criminals.  The use of informers during precious 
metals undercover operations are necessitated due to their knowledge of and 
involvement with syndicate role players. Informers may be considered for the 
following roles during an undercover operation: Agent, introduction of agents to 
suspects, intelligence gathering and surveillance. Crimes committed in secrecy 
will not be uncovered without the assistance and participation of informers.  To 
curb precious metals related crime requires well planned undercover operations 
and an effective informer network. 
• The credibility of the informer, his or her abilities, background, profile, related 
experience and the task at hand will determine the role of the informer during 
an undercover operation.  
• Only reliable, well-trained and experienced informers should be considered for 
use during an undercover operation.  
• Informers and agents do not share the same meaning.  An informer is protected 
by means of the informer privilege.  When an informer is used as an agent, the 
informer cannot resort to the informer privilege, since he or she is bound by the 
stipulations of section 252(A) of the Criminal Procedure Act, Act 51 of 1977. 
• Full-time informers and paid informers are predominantly active within the 
precious metals domain. Detectives need to posses the necessary knowledge 
and experience to correctly identify, classify and handle informers. This will 
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ensure that these individuals are optimally utilized during undercover 
operations.  
• Financial motives, elimination of rival groups and ulterior motives are closely 
connected to precious metals investigations, due to the monetary incentives 
that it holds. 
• Problems with informers during precious metals undercover operations are the 
result of the following: 
• Failure by the South African Police Service to properly train informers for 
the task at hand. 
• A lack of proper control over informers. 
• The unscrupulous conduct by some informers that led to the acquittal of 
suspected precious metals syndicate members and leaders.  
• A lack of training of agents and detectives involved with informers during 
precious metals undercover operations. 
• The majority of participants have a good understanding of and vast experience 
of aspects that need contemplation before a precious metals undercover 
operation.  However, a few participating detectives do not have the necessary 
knowledge to successfully plan and execute an undercover operation.  The 
following aspects need especial attention: informer handling, training of the 
informers and profile of the informer.  Not all of the participating detectives are 
fully aware of the requirements and contents of the informer privilege.  Not all 
investigators are cognizant of informers with ulterior motives and a motive to 
eliminate rival groups. 
 
  
4.3 Recommendations 
 
In order to address the shortcomings with regards to the use of informers during 
precious metals undercover operations the following recommendations are made to 
improve undercover operations: 
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• An undercover operations user guideline/manual needs to be compiled to 
assist and guide investigators during the phases of undercover operations.  It 
needs to consist of all legal requirements, reported judgments, internal South 
African Police Service directives and best practices.  Aspects that need 
consideration before embarking onto an undercover operation needs to be 
included into the guidelines.  It is submitted that the manual needs to be 
updated on an annual basis with regards to juris prudence and best practises. 
The updated version should be circulated to all users of undercover operations. 
• A database that is inter-connected between all users of undercover operations 
should be created because of a dire need by all users of undercover 
operations.  The database needs to furnish detectives, agents and advocates 
with new tendencies amongst syndicates and successful strategies and 
methodologies utilised by detectives.  It is imperative that a data capturer and 
analyst should be appointed at the South African Police Service Head Office to 
administer the system.  The database should be to the disposal of all users of 
undercover operations, since it may enrich all users of undercover operations 
and not just users of precious metals undercover operations.   
• It is recommended that practical and theoretical training need to be combined 
to be successful with this approach.  
• Prosecuting advocates should be trained with regards to the operational 
side of an undercover operation and the assumed life of the agent. 
Prosecutors need to be acquainted with the terminology used, 
procedures with regards to the processing and refining of precious 
metals and modus operandi of precious metals syndicates.  
• Informers need to be trained on operational aspects, by experienced 
agents who participated in similar undercover operations.  It is 
recommended that role-playing need to take place where prospected 
agents can be properly evaluated and guided on possible scenarios that 
may come their side.  It is further recommended that informers be 
trained intensely by the prosecuting advocate on all legal issues that 
may have bearing on the individuals and the operation. 
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• It is strongly recommended that a training course for detectives and   
informer handlers needs to be developed and implemented on 
undercover operations. Detectives should be trained on the following 
aspects: 
 Legal issues. 
 Project management principles. 
 Informer’s motives and type of informers. 
 The roles that an informer can be considered for during an 
undercover operation. 
  Aspects that need consideration during precious metals 
undercover operations.     
• An internal South African Police Service directive should be developed and 
implemented to ensure uniformity with the application of undercover operations.  
The emphasis needs to be based on guidelines for the proper execution of 
undercover operations.  Undercover operations are not rigid and therefore it is 
important not to captivate detectives with strict directives, rather guide them to 
the effective planning, execution and termination of undercover operations in 
general. 
• Continuous research on forensic investigation methods and techniques are 
recommended, because it is invaluable towards combating crime in South 
Africa.  Crime phenomena, crime patterns and modus operandi by criminal 
syndicates should be researched to keep track with the ever changing 
technological advanced era that we function in. It is the only way of keeping up 
with criminals and developing methods, techniques and operational strategies 
to counter and control criminal activities. 
 
   
4.4 Conclusion 
 
The use of informers and undercover operations will remain an important and effective 
manner to gather evidence and intelligence against precious metals perpetrators.  It is 
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a justified method within the forensic investigation field to address organised crime 
activities.  
 
This research has revealed many challenges in the use of informers during 
undercover operations.  Training of role players and proper guidelines are of vital 
importance to ensure that undercover operations are conducted properly and within 
the boundaries of the law.   It is of essence that users of undercover operations need 
to do all in their power to keep the system clean of unlawful practices.  If the 
recommendations that were made to address these challenges can be implemented 
by the South African Police Service and justice role players it will definitely enhance 
undercover operations and limit criticism against the system to the minimum.  
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ANNEXURE “A” 
 
 
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE: DETECTIVE PARTICIPANTS 
 
THE USE OF INFORMERS DURING PRECIOUS METALS UNDERCOVER 
OPERATIONS. 
 
SECTION A 
1. How old are you? 
PERSONAL DETAILS 
2.  Designation?     
3. State the name of the unit you are attached to? 
4. For how long have you been employed within the crime investigation domain? 
5. Did you attend a detective training course? 
Yes/No 
6. Did you undergo specialised training with regards to the following fields? 
Organised Crime    Yes/No  
Precious Metals   Yes/No 
Undercover operations  Yes/No 
Informer handling   Yes/No 
7. In how many undercover operations did you participate in? 
 
 
SECTION B 
8. What do you understand of the concept forensic investigation?  
UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS  
9. Name the objectives of forensic investigation? 
10. Are you of the opinion that the use of informers during precious metals undercover 
operations is integral to forensic investigation? 
Yes/No Motivate  
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11. What do you understand of the concept undercover operation? 
12. What is the purpose of undercover operations? 
13. Are you of the opinion that an undercover operation is analog to a trap? 
Yes/No Motivate    
14. Is an effective method to investigate precious metals related crimes? 
Yes/No Motivate 
15. Discuss the phases of an undercover operation? 
16. Are you of the opinion that undercover operations are judicially sufficiently 
demarcated? 
Yes/No Motivate 
17. Name as many as possible judicial measures to control undercover operations. 
18. Is the application of undercover operations sufficiently regulated and controlled 
within SAPS? 
Yes/No Motivate  
19. What is the purpose of section 252(A) of the Criminal Procedure Act, 51/1977? 
20. What effect does section 252(A) Act 51/1977 has on the execution of undercover 
operations? 
21. Indicate how you would ensure that evidence gathered in terms of section    
252(A) of the Criminal Procedure Act is corroborated? 
22. What measures do you implement to ensure that undercover operations are fairly 
set? 
 
 
SECTION C 
23. Name as many as possible motives of informers for giving information.  
INFORMERS  
24. Which of these are the most applicable to precious metals undercover operations? 
25. Name as many as possible types of informers?  
26. Which of them are the most applicable to precious metals undercover operations? 
27. What is your understanding of the informer privilege? 
28. Are there exceptions to the informer privilege? 
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Yes/No Motivate 
29. What is the effect of the informer privilege when an informer is used as an agent 
during an undercover operation? 
30. Mention the roles that an informer can be used for during precious metals 
undercover operations? 
31. Which factors do you take into consideration when deciding on the role for the 
informer during an undercover operation? 
32. Under which circumstances would you deviate from the original role decided upon 
for the informer? 
33. Is there any role that you would not consider an informer for? 
34. Would you consider using an informer in the role of agent during an undercover 
operation? 
Yes/No Motivate  
35. Briefly discuss aspects that need consideration when making use of informers 
during undercover operations? 
36. What aspects do you attend to when training an informer for an undercover 
operation? 
37. Which of these aspects lacks attention during precious metals undercover 
operations? 
38. Make suggestions on how to improve and rectify the situation? 
39. What problems do you encounter with informers during undercover operations? 
40. Make suggestions on how to minimise these problems? 
41. What measures do you implement to corroborate the evidence gathered by an 
agent/informer? 
42. What type of informer rewards is applicable to precious metals investigations? 
43. How do you determine the reward to be paid to an informer? 
44. If your informer still has to testify in your case, would you pay his reward before he 
has testified or afterwards? 
Before/ Afterwards Motivate: 
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ANNEXURE “B” 
 
 
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE: ADVOCATE PARTICIPANTS 
 
THE USE OF INFORMERS DURING PRECIOUS METALS UNDERCOVER 
OPERATIONS. 
 
SECTION A 
 
PERSONAL DETAILS 
1. How old are you? 
2. For how long have you been an advocate with the DPP? 
3.  Did you undergo specialised training with regards to the following fields? 
Organised crime prosecutions    Yes/No 
Precious metals investigations     Yes/No 
Undercover Operations     Yes/No 
4. How many undercover operations did you prosecute? 
 
 
SECTION B 
 
UNDERCOVER POLICE OPERATIONS  
5. What do you understand of the concept undercover operation? 
6. What is the purpose of undercover operations? 
7. Is it an effective method to address precious metals related crime? 
Yes/No Motivate 
8. Are you of the opinion that undercover operations are judicially sufficiently 
regulated?  
Yes/No Motivate 
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9. Is the application of undercover operations sufficiently controlled and regulated 
within SAPS? 
Yes/No Motivate 
10. What is the effect of section 252(A) Act 51/77 on the execution of undercover 
operations? 
11. What measures do you implement to ensure that undercover operations are fairly 
set? 
12. Would you consider utilising informers as agents during undercover operations? 
Yes/No Motivate 
13. What problems do you encounter with the use of informers during undercover 
operations? 
14. Make suggestions on how to minimise these problems? 
15. What problems do you encounter in general with regards to undercover 
operations? 
16. Make suggestions on how to minimise these problems? 
 
